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Namibia's founding election did not bring SWAPO a two-thirds majority. Opposition parties' 
combined votes totalled a third of the poll, giving a strong minority of National Assembly seats 
to a number of opposition parties. Namibia seemed a ready example of a successful negotiated 
transition to multi-party democracy. However, in the first five years since independence the 
opposition parties have fallen behind as SW APO has continued to consolidate its electoral and 
legislative power. In the first five years since independence the opposition parties have had 
little effect on government policy-making and have declined significantly in electoral strength -
in the second National Assembly election in December 1994 the opposition parties combined 
decreased from 31 to 19 seats. SW APO, therefore, gained a resounding two-thirds majority, 
raising concern that Namibia is largely a de facto one-party state. 
This paper explores reasons for the lack of opposition party influence in the First Parliament 
and for the electoral decline experienced by the opposition. It is based on interviews with 
several opposition party leaders as well a other individuals with Namibian expertise. 
Conclusions are also drawn from primary research on the Hansard debates of the Namibian 
National Assembly, the Constitution and the Standing Rules and Orders of the National 
Assembly. 
Institutional structures within the existing Namibian political system are one reason fro the 
decline of-opposition politics in the country: they limit opposition parties' ability to develop 
both a wider support base and, concurrently, to influence legislation. Equally important in 
stifling the growth of the opposition parties are organisation and other internal weaknesses on 
the part of the parties themselves. Socio-cultural realities in Namibia likewise affect the 
growth of opposition parties. 
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Namibia gained independence in 1990 after a non-racial democratic election coordinated and run by 
the United Nations. The founding election followed on the heels of a long and uncertain transitional 
period, in large part brokered by the international community. The new Namibian Constitution 
provided for a multi-party framework within a majoritarian parliamentary political system. The South 
West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) won the founding elections with 57.3% of the vote: 
giving it 41 seats in the Constitutional Assembly1. The party polling the second highest number of 
votes, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), became the formal opposition with 28.6% of the 
vote: the DTA obtained 21 seats in the Constitutional Assembly. Eight other parties contested the 
election and several of them gained a few parliamentary seats. The second parliamentary election in 
December 1994 saw an even greater dominance by the majority party, SWAPO, and a significant 
decrease in electoral support for the opposition parties. 
National Assembly Election Results 
Percentage of Vote/Number of Seats 
SWAPO 50.ec-. 
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1The Constitutional Assembly was automatically transformed into the National Assembly upon ratification of the 
new Constitution; members of the Constitutional Assembly unanimously accepted the Constitution ninety days into the 
Assembly's first session. 
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The decline of oppositional politics2 in Namibia, a country which has been hailed for its highly 
democratic constitution and tolerant, non-violent political culture, does not bode well for the firm 
consolidation of democracy in the country.3 Although the Namibian political arena has made 
provision for opposition parties, and there is often active debate among members of opposing parties 
in the National Assembly, there is growing concern from within and without the country that Namibia 
is increasingly becoming a one-party dominated state. This is especially true since in the 1994 
elections SW APO won a resounding 72% of the votes, giving the party a constitutional two-thirds 
majority and, in many ways, transforming Namibia into a de facto one-party state. SW APO now has 
the political power to rewrite the Constitution and almost wholly direct policy. 
SW APO is the most organised party, possesses broad national support4 and significant human and 
financial resources. The party also has the advantage of being a liberation-movement-tumed-
political-party, a symbolic significance which has carried past the founding election. Only three 
parties, including SW APO, contested the 1992 Regional and Local Elections, because, according to 
the other opposition partie~, party and candidate registration fees were too high for smaller parties. 
In the majority of constituencies, SW APO candidates stood uncontested. Opposition parties indicate 
that they have been unable to expand and consolidate their support bases in the past five years, which 
they partially attribute to insufficient funding and relative political inexperience. 
In addition to lack of resources and inexperience, there is indication that structural factors also inhibit 
the growth and consolidation of a political opposition in Namibia. Opportunities for the Opposition 
to have a voice in policy-making may be constrained by the operating political system. The form that 
oppositional politics takes within a majoritarian parliamentary system is shaped, to a large extent, by 
2nrroughout this paper the terrn Opposition will refer to all of the opposition parties as a whole. The term Official 
Opposition will refer to the electorally largest opposition party; in the case of Namibia, this position is occupied by the 
DTA. 
3This paper is premised on a theoretical framework which posits that the consolidation of democracy is encouraged 
by, indeed is dependent upon, a two-party or a multi-party system. Future studies may challenge this framework and suggest 
that one-party democracy is possible in Namibia. 
"Much of this support comes from the Ovambo-speaking people, who comprise nearly 60% of the population. 
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the procedures and norms of the executive and legislative bodies: the National Assembly, the Cabinet 
and the committees. Similarly, the cultural and social setting within which Namibian politics are 
played out may be a significant factor in limiting the influence and support base of the opposition 
parties. 
The study of the Opposition 
Today one is inclined to regard the existence of an opposition party as very nearly the 
most distinctive characteristic of democracy itself, and we take the absence of an 
opposition party as evidence, if not always conclusive proof, for the absence of 
democracy. 5 
According to Dahl, the existence and role of opposition structures, and specifically of opposition 
parties, is integral to the democratic nature of a polity. The ability of a society to make room for and, 
indeed, to encourage organised opposition to the government is often vital to the overall stability of 
the state. When the Constitution of a country makes specific provision for opposition parties and 
provides structures for their proliferation and effective operation the country is usually considered 
more highly democratic than a country which either denies the existence of opposition parties or 
seriously restricts their ability to function effectively. 
Opposition parties are the main agent of formal counter-policy to majority party legislation. As such 
they provide an outlet for citizens to protest against government policies while still accepting the 
integrity of the state; in a one-party state there is no such outlet against the government -- discontent 
with the government is often directly associated with discontent with the state. 6 There is, thus, a 
strong link between oppositional politics and democratic theory, and, a fair acceptance among 
scholars that the study of opposition parties within a country can provide significant insight into the 
democratic nature of that society. 
5RobertDahl, Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) p. xvi 
6As Robert Dahl argues, 'a loyal and legal opposition can be viewed as a means of managing the major political 
conflicts of the society.' Quoted in Rodney Barker, Studies in Opposition (London: Macmillan Press, 1971) p. 5. 
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The study of opposition structures is particularly important in Namibia. Functioning political 
democracy is new to Namibia; the Constitution provides for wide-ranging rights and the political 
arena seems to encourage divergent viewpoints. The consolidation of a tolerant, democratic 
political culture, however, is still fairly tenuous. As with all new democracies, Namibia is at risk of 
losing the democratic precedents set by its founding elections. This is especially so in light of the 
emerging de facto one-party state system, or dominant party system, ushered in by last year's 
parliamentary and presidential elections. 
The implications of a declining democratic political arena in Namibia have broad ranging implications 
for the rest of southern Afiica, and perhaps for the rest of Africa as a whole. Namibia has a colonial 
history similar to many of its neighbouring countries; it suffers from similar underdevelopment and 
ethnic fragmentation. Like many other southern Afiican countries, Namibia has a history of armed 
struggle for independence and a long transition to democratic governance. The success of the 
founding elections rested, in large part, on a platform of national reconciliation and national unity. 
Political parties with widely divergent views and constituencies came together in the interests of 
nation-building for the founding elections. This is likewise true for South Africa, and somewhat true 
for Mozambique and the current process under way in Angola. For five years Namibia has relatively 
successfully upheld a culture of tolerance and a culture of individual rights -- both emblematic of 
democratic values. Yet, the fall of the Opposition and the burgeoning of SW APO bespeak a different 
story. If other countries seek to follow the example set by Namibia in the implementation of a 
democratic government and a peaceful first five years of independence, they should look closely at 
the record of the Namibian Opposition and the reasons for its demise. 
Structure of the paper 
The overall goal of this study is to analyse the legislative effectiveness of the opposition parties in 
Namibia and indicate factors for their relative overall weakness in that arena, as well as their failure 
to grow electorally in the first five years since independence. The first chapter of this paper provides 
a theoretical framework on the nature of opposition parties within democratically governed societies: 
breeching such topics as the role of an opposition party, the importance of an Opposition for effective 
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and sustainable democratic government and most significant to the Namibian case, the role an 
opposition should play within a multi-party majoritarian parliamentary system. 
The second chapter of this paper examines the structures of Namibia's political arena. Here I 
describe the political system in detail, noting how the National Assembly operates, how members are 
elected, and how policy takes shape. This section likewise contains an explanation of existing 
structures for political opposition; here I will examine the Standing Rules and Orders of the National 
Assembly, and indicate how the Cabinet and the committees are appointed. Here the provisions 
provisions which would or could help the opposition parties to affect legislation are explored. I also 
comment on non-structural provisions which have been established in an effort to encourage the 
growth and effectiveness of opposition parties. 
The third chapter focuses on an analysis of opposition activity in the First Parliament, from 1990-
1994. I review National Assembly records, giving both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis of 
opposition parties' participation. This analysis attempts to address the role that the opposition has 
set for itself in the actual proceedings of the legislative branch, and how this role is accepted and 
played out within Parliament. Central to the analysis is a study of debate on a key bill which makes 
note of amendments that opposition parties have influenced. 
The fourth and fifth chapters of this paper make arguments for why and how the opposition parties 
have been limited in the Namibian political sphere. I base this section on a study of institutional 
factors and interviews with opposition party leaders and political analysts. This includes limitations 
of an institutional nature as well as those of an organisational nature on the part of the opposition 
parties themselves. Similarly, I examine the possible cultural and socio-economic factors which have 
an important affect on the influence and growth of the opposition parties. 
Finally, in chapter six I examine the changes that are necessary to stay the demise of the opposition 
in Namibia and restrain the dominance of SW APO. Based on the two preceding chapters and 
chapter two's account of the structural means available for the Opposition, I will make prescriptive 
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recommendations for improvements in the system and within the parties themselves. 
Much of this paper is based on interviews I conducted with three of the opposition party leaders, all 
of whom held seats in the First Parliament and who likewise hold a seat in the Second Parliament: 
DTA leader Mishake Muyongo, DCN leader Moses Katjioungua, 7 and UDF leader Chief Justus 
Garoeb. While conducting my research in Namibia I also contacted Erin Martin, Namibia Director 
for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI); she offered valuable insight and 
useful contacts. Before and after my trip to Windhoek various other individuals affiliated with NDI, 
especially Mary Elizabeth Johnson, gave me assistance in obtaining information and contacting 
people. I also gained information during an interview with CHR Michelesen Institute Research 
Fellow, Richard Moorsom. Other primary sources which I have used include: Republic of Namibia 
Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard), Vol. 1-42 (March 1990-0ctober 1994); The 
Constitution of the Republic of Namibia; the National Assembly's Standing Rules and Orders; and 
various issues of The Namibian. 
Throughout the gathering of data for this paper I encountered a number of difficulties obtaining 
information and getting responses from political party leaders and political analysts. For instance, 
I was unable to reach any other opposition leaders either before I travelled to Namibia or during the 
course of my stay there. The Secretary of the National Assembly was unable to provide me with any 
information on the committee system i.e. how they are appointed and which ones have or do exist. 
In fact, this was difficult information to obtain. None of the political analysts or party leaders whom 
I asked for this information responded to my numerous telephone calls, faxes and letters. I finally 
turned to the U.S. Embassy in Windhoek for assistance in gaining this information and received a 
prompt reply from First Secretary, Carl F. Troy, who provided essential insight into the Namibian 
committee system, as well as further contacts. 
7Moses Katjioungua was leader of the NPF in the First Parliament. 
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CHAPTER II 
UNDERSTANDING PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION 
DEFINING THE OPPOSITION 
. . . constitutional opposition belongs to a peaceful view of politics, not to a warlike 
approach in which the opposer is the enemy, an hostis ... We say: an opposition must 
oppose, but not obstruct; it must be constructive, not disruptive. Indeed, in many 
accounts opposition is understood as a form of collaboration. 1 
The study of political opposition has a long history. Even a summary review of the literature 
indicates that there are many conceptions of the form that political opposition can take and also many 
divergent opinions regarding the importance that political opposition plays in a democratically 
functioning society. 
Broadly speaking, political opposition represents the people, group or groups which initiate action 
against the status quo governing groups or structures. Opposition can manifest itself informally, as 
in spontaneous demonstrations against the government or particular governmental bodies; or, 
opposition to the state can be highly organised in the form of mass marches, or groups which stand 
permanently to protest government actions and attempt to alter the policy decisions of government. 
The form of opposition with which I am concerned throughout this study is formal opposition 
embodied in political parties. According to political theory, apposition parties can perform one or 
all of several distinct roles within a political system. Opisthion parties can be, first of all, a safety 
valve for discontent within a society. In this vein opposition parties allow frustration and anger to 
be expressed against ruling party policies - this is legitimate opposition to the government which, 
because it is constitutionally mandated, does not usually threaten to destabilise the entire political 
process in a country. The safety valve role of opposition parties is consistent with the two main 
models of democratic governance which will be examined in this chapter: majoritarian parliamentary 
democracy and consociational democracy. 2 Opposition in two-party or multi-party systems can also 
play the 'alternative government' role. In this capacity the opposition or opposition parties are 
1Rodney Barker, Studies in Opposition, (London: Macmillan Press, 1971 ), p. 33. 
2Even within a consociational system minority parties which may form part of the government often have policy 
platforms which are not necessarily consistent with that of the majority party. 
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considered , by themselves, and by the electorate, as comprising that group of politicos who might 
form the government in the next election. This role is limited to majoritarian systems, however, as 
the consociational model rests upon the principle of government power-sharing in which opposition -
minority - parties are already part of the government. Opposition parties are also generally viewed 
as an important means of censure on absolute majority party dominance - the watchdog role. This 
differs from the safety valve role which benefits, primarily, the party in power. Instead the watchdog 
role in to the benefit, theoretically, of the plural society and the maintenance of a freer, more open 
government. In a two-party or multi-party system, the opposition can vocalise dissent to government 
policy and can maintain, through various structures, pressure on the government to conform to 
pluralistic demands. 
The Opposition does not denounce the structures within which it functions. As Barker suggests, 
"Opposition may be used to denote a loyal opposition which opposes the commanding group without 
either contesting its legitimacy or threatening or rejecting the basis of the state or the constitution. "3 
Opposition, therefore, is understood as a loyal opposition to the currently governing party. This 
formalised political opposition within the government structures will be referred to as Opposition, 
with a capital "O." 
Although the Opposition may contest government policies, and denounce the actions of the party 
which holds the greatest number of seats in the legislative body, it remains an integral part of the 
government. Depending on how well opposition parties manage to fulfill the theoretical roles open 
to them - safety valve, watchdog or alternative government - given the specific political context, they 
are a vital part of continued democratisation in any country. The next section examines the three 
basic roles of opposition parties in greater detail. 
ROLE OF THE OPPOSITION 
Since Namibia is a parliamentary system the role of the opposition in this study will be limited to 
3Rodney Barker, Studies in Opposition, (London: Macmillan Press, 1971 ), p. 5. 
8 
parliamentary models of democratic government. In the context of a parliamentary political system, 
the formal Opposition has a number of important roles to play. Robert Dahl, for instance, has 
suggested that "a loyal and legal opposition can be viewed as a means of managing the major political 
conflicts of a society. "4 Dissent and discontent with current policies have a greater chance of being 
directed at the party forming the government, rather than at the Government or State as a whole if 
there exists an outlet for this dissent, as explained above. Therefore, individuals are given the 
opportunity to register their dissatisfaction with the government by channelling support into the 
Opposition; since they can protest government policies through formal opposition parties there is less 
chance that they will be alienated from the State or that they will lose faith in the entire system of 
government. "The existence of multiple minority parties enables discontent, divergent interests and 
antagonisms between groups to be publicly registered, to be directed against the dominant party and 
against government, without being directed against the system. "5 
The.· opposition parties are also valuable in checking governmental powe~s, thereby limiting the 
. .· 
dominance of the majority party or the ruling coalition. In this capacity the Opposition is acting as 
a watchdog on the government. Thus, while opposition parties may often lack the strength and 
numbers to introduce and pass legislation, they can provide a constant voice of protest in the 
legislative body. Opposition parties can also present criticism of government actions to the 
electorate, prompting the population to pressure the government or to reorient their support to one 
or another of the opposition parties. 
In the traditional parliamentary setting with the majority party forming the government and the 
opposition party or parties representing a loyal opposition, the Opposition is the "alternative 
government" -- in the next election it could be at the helm. At times, however, the opposition parties 
are so small, their seats in the legislative body are so negligible, that they cannot be an actual 
alternative government; this is the case in Namibia's Second Parliament. If a party has only one or 
4Jbid, p. 9. 
5 Angela Sutherland Burger, Opposition in a Dominant Party System (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1969), p. 283. 
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two seats in the legislature, as opposed to, for instance, fifty seats on the part of the ruling party, the 
electorate will have very little reason to view the Opposition as a possible "government in waiting." 
Likewise, there is little chance that the party members will consider themselves as an alternative 
government. In this instance the opposition parties will fulfill the other functions available to 
opposition parties within a democratically functioning society. 
In performing these functions their legislators and party workers can participate in a 
variety of activities both in and outside the formal governmental bodies, some 
constitutional and some extraconstitutional. These activities are considered from a 
standpoint of building and maintaining opposition parties -- not with respect to how 
opposition parties maintain the existing political order by preparing alternative 
government leadership or policies, but how and to what degree the opposition 
participates in legislative and administrative policy decisions, or how they support or 
attack the existing constitutional order. 6 
DEMOCRATIC MODELS AND THE OPPOSITION 
The manner in which the opposition plays out its role, indeed, the very parameters of its role, are 
defined in large part by the type of governing structures which are operative in a country. Thus, the 
position and opportunities available to the opposition parties relates directly to the model of 
democracy which has been adopted by a society. The theoretical exploration of opposition parties 
in this chapter has been limited to parliamentary systems. Within parliamentary system a myriad of 
models are possible. The two ends of the democratic model continuum within parliamentary systems· 
are majoritarian rule versus consociational rule. The next section will define these two models and 
explore the role of opposition parties within each. 
The Majoritarian Democratic Model 
A majoritarian parliamentary model - of which the best example is Britain, hence the model is often 
referred to as the Westminster model - is characterised by majority party government. The party 
6Burger, p. 19. The author also notes that multiple political parties can be instrumental in mobilising 
increasing numbers of people. 'As part of the mobilisation process, they encourage the development of different kinds 
of groups on a broader basis than before - they help to organise and integrate a fragmented society.' p. 283. 
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which wins the greatest number of seats in an election gains executive power. The leader of this 
party often becomes the head of government - usually the Prime Minister - and the Cabinet reflects 
the dominant electoral strength of the majority party. This means that within the strict majoritarian 
model the cabinet usually consists of one-party though in the case of a minority party winning a 
strong minority of the votes, a bare-majority cabinet is usually formed, because the majority party 
does not have quite enough votes to form a cabinet without some minority inclusion. . In such a 
system, as Lijphart explains, 'A large minority is excluded from power and condemned to the role of 
opposition,' during the ruling mandate of the majority party. 7 
The losing party or parties, those left out of executive government during the ruling mandate of the 
majority party, take the role of the loyal opposition within the system. The opposition, in the 
majoritarian system, fulfils its role through the functions noted above: alternative government, 
watchdog status, a:nd safety valve. It is in the strict majoritarian system that opposition parties fulfill 
a structured role .. 
The Consociational Democratic Model 
Whereas in the majoritarian model of democracy a highly structured opposition is necessary, as a 
means of criticising and acting as a check on the ruling party and in an effort to gain votes against the 
government, the consociational model presents a much less formal role for opposition parties. The 
consociational model implies a consensus government, whereby all parties form the government and 
make policy in a spirit of compromise and conciliation. 8 Therefore, though there may be a majority 
party -- which wins the greatest number of seats in the legislative body -- the smaller, minority parties 
are brought into a governing coalition; opposition interests are implicity represented within the 
government. 9 The minority parties, within a consociational system, do not fulfill a role as formal 
7 Arend Lijphart, Democracies, Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984) p. 6. 
8 Arend Lijphart, 'Consociational Democracy,' World Politics, Vol 14, no 2, (January 1969). 
9The consensus system definition differs from Lijphart's earlier concept of consociationalism in which minority 
parties are constitutionally allotted cabinet and parliamentary committee positions in proportion to the percentage of 
votes they have polled. The main idea of a consensus system, therefore, is the inclusion of a number of parties, a number 
of political positions, into the executive, and hence into policy formulation. 
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Opposition. Since they are part of the government, they do not play a role in criticising the 
government or in presenting themselves as an "alternative government." Consociational models have 
been suggested as effective in highly heterogenous or ethnically fragmented societies; such a system 
creates constitutional guarantees whereby minority positions are incorporated into the government. 10 
Countries often adopt consociational systems as part of a negotiated transition to a new democratic 
dispensation. In the South African case the old regime was convinced to concede power in part 
because it was guaranteed influence in a power-sharing system with the majority party. The problem 
with the consociational model, according to Shapiro and Jung, is its inability to create space for an 
Opposition; most problematic, suggest these authors, is the corresponding discontent focused on the 
state because there is no outlet for formal protest against the government. 11 In a consensus type of 
government, in which a party or party enters into a governing coalition, these minority parties forego 
there status as opposition - in many countries, such as Senegal, for instance, the minority parties which 
accept positions in the government often concede their liberty to critique the government while at the 
same time not gaining any tangible means of affecting policy. 12 
Namibia and the Role of the Democratic Model 
The eventual 1988 settlement in Namibia called for a founding election, though not one based upon 
a coalition of national unity as exists in South Africa. Instead of a formalised power-sharing 
arrangement for the first government, a less tangible, "officially encouraged climate of national 
reconciliation" was adopted by the contesting parties and then by the parties which formed the 
10Lijphart notes Switzerland as a main example of permanent consensus government. However, more recent 
examples of the model exist, such as that of South Africa's Government of National Unity. Indeed Namibia's First Parliament 
falls somewhere within the consensus model as it was an understood government of national unity, in which members of 
minority parties were included in executive positions. 
11Ian Shapiro and Courtney Jung. South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy and Opposition in 
Comparative Perspeetive, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 1052, Yale University, 1994. 
12Minority party members who entered into a governing coalition in Dioufs majority PS ceded their guaranteed 
rights to criticise government policy: for instance, PIT members in executive positions were sent packing upon 
criticising the PS of bad governance. There is no set formula on the part of the PS for sacking minority ministers the 
important thing to note is that the opposition members who take positions in the executive cannot play their role as 
critical watchdog to its full extent in a consensus system. 
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government. 13 The winning party, therefore, was not constitutionally bound to include opposition 
members within Cabinet, for instance; although the principle of national reconciliation strongly 
encouraged SWAPO to do so. 14 
Since Namibia's government is not premised on the consociational model of power-sharing, there 
should be greater institutional opportunity for an effective formal opposition within Parliament. 
Indeed, the DTA represented a numerically strong oppositional camp in the first Parliament, with 29% 
of the National Assembly seats and a strong showing in the National Council. 15 DTA members within 
the National Assembly offered frequent critique to government policies, and the party chose not to 
participate in the first Cabinet, preferring to retain a role as the Official Opposition. 
As noted in the introduction, despite the fact that a majoritarian model of democracy, rather than a 
consociational model, was adopted in Namibia, the country is increasingly moving toward a de facto 
one-party state within a multi.:.party con8titutional framework. SW APO has been extremely effective 
in consolidating its power both nationally and regionally. In the 1992 ·regional and local elections 
SW APO gained 80 of the 90 possible regional and local government seats and 19of26 National 
Council seats. Indeed, in the current context, though its system should intimate a greater chance for 
strong oppositional politics, the country seems unable to sustain and further entrench a flourishing 
multi-party democracy. The following chapter explores the existing political system, analysing 
structures which exist to encourage effective opposition participation in the political arena. 
13Barney Mthmombothi, 'SW APO confounds critics,' Argus, 12 February 1992. 
14SWAPO did, indeed, choose to include non-SWAPO members in its first Cabinet, including the position of 
Attorney General, Auditor General and the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Justice and Transport. Linda Freeman, 
'Contradictions of Independence: Namibia in Transition,' Transformation 17 (1992) p. 37. 




NAMIBIA'S POLITICAL ARENA 
THE POLITICAL ARENA 
The Legislative and Executive Branches 
As previously noted, Namibia has a majoritarian parliamentary system. The legislative branch is 
'broken down into the National Assembly and the National Council. The 72 members of the National 
Assembly are elected on a proportional representation party-list system; the 26 members of the 
National Council are indirectly elected from among members of the country's thirteen Regional 
Councils by said members. 
The National Assembly has the power to pass laws with the approval of the National Council and 
the assent of the President. The National Council has the power to review all legislation and make 
amendments, but no power of veto over acts passed by the National Assembly. The National 
Council is considered primarily a review body -- this house does not introduce legislation. 
Namibia has both a President and a Prime Minister. The President is Head of State and Government; 
the Namibian Constitution vests executive power for the country in the President, subject to 
consultation with the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister; the Cabinet is appointed by the President 
from among members of the National Assembly, 1 including six non-voting members who have been 
appointed by the President. Parliament is called into session and can be dissolved by the President. 
The National Assembly may, subject to other provisions in the Constitution, with a two-thirds vote, 
"review, reverse or correct" any decision or action taken by the President.2 
The Prime Minister is the leader of government business in Parliament; she coordinates Cabinet work 
and advises/assists the President in fulfilling the functions of government. 3 In addition to directing 
1 Although the Constitution states that Cabinet members are appointed from among members of the National 
Assembly, this was not the case in the first Cabinet: President Nujoma appointed two individuals from the general public 
to ministerial positions. 
2The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Chapter 5. 
3The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Chapter 6. 
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the activities of the government ministries, departments and government parastatals, Cabinet members 
initiate bills in the National Assembly. They must also be available to answer queries in the Assembly 
regarding governinent policies, both within Assembly sessions and, if so called upon, at committee 
and sub-committee sittings. 
The creation of policy 
The institutional framework and procedures for legislation in Namibia are modeled on the 
Caribbean/ African Commonwealth parliamentary system. 4 According to this model, Cabinet 
members introduce legislation into the National Assembly. After consultation with the Attorney-
General regarding the necessity of such legislation, the sponsoring minister submits a memorandum 
with a draft copy of the bill to the Cabinet. When the bill gains initial approval from the Cabinet, the 
Ministry of Justice makes a formal draft, which returns to the Attorney-General for full certification. 
Once Cabinet has approved the formal edition of the bill it is introduced to the National Assembly for 
a first reading. Debate on the principles and processes of the proposal briefly ensue after the first 
reading in the Assembly. After the second reading the bill is debated again, with private members5 
of the Assembly offering possible amendments. Following second reading debate the bill may be 
ordered to be considered in a Committee of the Whole Assembly or it may be referred to some other 
committee for report and possible amendment. After the bill has passed the committee stage, it is 
reintroduced into the Assembly for a third reading, including a report on any amendments which have 
been suggested by members during the second reading, or amendments recommended by the standing 
or select committee. Once the bill has passed a third reading it is considered to have been passed by 
the National Assembly and is then referred to the National Council for approval. If the National 
Council returns the bill to the Assembly without amendment it is forthwith presented to the President 
for assent. If the President vetoes the bill it returns to the National Assembly where it must be 
passed by a two-thirds majority in order to override the President's veto. 
4NDI. Namibia Briefing Paper. 
5Private members are non-Cabinet members of the National Assembly. 
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The National Council can make one of three responses to legislation sent over from the National 
Assembly. Firstly, the lower house can accept the bill in original form; in this case the legislative 
branch has passed the bill -- only the President's approval awaits. Secondly, the National Council can 
make amendments to the bill; in this case the National Assembly considers the changes and can 
either vote to accept the bill with amendments or pass the bill in its original form by a simple majority 
vote. Finally the National Council can reject the bill in principle if members disagree with the idea 
or need for such legislation. In order for the National Assembly to overturn a bill rejected by the 
National Council in principle, members of the upper house must repass the bill with a two-thirds 
majority. 6 
The National Assembly's Standing Committee on Rules and Procedures plans to institute additional 
committees with substantive specialties and to exercise policy oversight. The Assembly at present 
has little in the way of professional staff Currently the Office of the Speaker and the Public Service 
Commission are negotiating conditions for additional staffing. 7 
STRUCTURES FOR OPPOSITION POLITICS 
The Constitution and the NA Standing Rules and Orders 
The negotiations for Namibian independence and subsequent founding elections did not usher in a 
power-sharing Government ofNational Unity; the opposition parties, therefore, retained their distinct 
place within a traditional parliamentary system. A study of both the Constitution and the National 
Assembly's Standing Rules and Orders, as well as a look at the less formalised parliamentary 
relationships, illustrates a significant lack of structures for an effective Opposition. 
6rf the National Council does not pass a bill within three months or thirty days (in the case of a Money Bill) from 
its introduction into the lower house, it returns to the National Assembly in its original form. 
7Nationa1Assembly of the Republic of Namibia, Standing Rules and Orders, pp. 40-41 and National Democratic 
Institute Namibia Briefing Paper, p. 13. 
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The Committee System 
Parliamentary committees and sub-committees present one manner in which opposition parties could 
have an effect on policy-making in a majoritarian system. After the second reading in the National 
Assembly bills are either discussed and amended in a Committee of the Whole Assembly or referred 
to a select or standing committee. According to the Speaker's interpretation of the rules and orders, 
" ... the referral of the Bill to the select committee is only after certain aspects have been seen either 
in terms of its shortcomings, in terms of its coverage, what needs to be added, deleted, or what needs 
to be modified to provide an acceptable language to both sides of the House ... "8 Theoretically, 
much of the detail of legislation is worked out in committee, which could give opposition members 
an important means of influencing policy. 
Unfortunately, neither the Constitution nor the standing rules and orders of the Assembly adequately 
describe the selection, appointment and boundaries of committees. The standing rules and orders 
merely indicate that "A committee shall consider such matters only as are referred to it by the 
Assembly," which beggars the question how the referrals are made, i.e. how they are voted for --
because if any member can make a general proposal for the committee to research something, this 
could give the Opposition considerable space to influence policy. The rules and orders make no 
mention of standing committees, but do indicate that select committee members are appointed by the 
Speaker.9 Though the Speaker, in explaining the committee referral process to the members, stated 
that Rule 84 of the standing rules and orders "provides for referral of a Bill to a select committee by 
way of a formal amendment," he is incorrect. The rule which mentions select committees, Rule 85, 
merely states that "When a bill has been read for a second time, it may .... either be ordered to be 
considered in Committee of the Whole Assembly on a day then named or be referred to some other 
committee." It is unclear how the referral is made, by whom and, equally significant, it is unclear how 
the committee members are selected. 
8 . 
Hansard. Vol. 42, p. 10. 
9National Assembly of the Republic of Namibia, Standing Rules and Orders, Rule 113, p. 43. 
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In addition to the lack of any standard rules or understanding for how the committee system is 
supposed to operate in Namibia, there appears to be a significant shortage of functioning committees. 
The three opposition leaders with whom I spoke, as well as the Secretary of the National Assembly, 
were unable to describe the process of committee selection or to indicate which committees are 
existent. Carl F. Troy, Human Rights/Democracy Project Officer at the United States Embassy in 
Windhoek offered some insight into this apparent confusion: 
Even in the short one year since all-race elections, the South African Parliament has 
moved forward on effective committee systems (and staffing) much faster than 
Namibia has done in the past five years. Until only very recently, there were no more 
than 3-4 staffers (including telephone receptionists and drivers!) for each house of the 
Namibian Parliament... After prolonged wrangling among themselves (mostly on to 
whom an expanded staff would report), a structure was approved for the hiring of 45 
staffers, most of whom would serve jointly for both the Assembly and the Council. .. 
In theory, there are a couple of Standing, Select, or Ad-hoc committees which exist 
to examine defense, civil service, and budgetary issues. However, unless and until the 
additional staffers... are in place and conversant with their duties, it has proved 
impossible for the Namibian Parliament to engage in an effective committee system. 
(No one to do the preparatory work, organise meetings, schedule hearings, perform 
follow-through, etc.) ... 10 
The Standing Committee on Rules and Procedures of the National Assembly had indicated a desire 
to create additional committees "with substantive specialties and to exercise policy oversight;" 
however, this did not appear to get off the ground before the completion of the First Parliament. 11 
According to Richard Moorsom, Research Fell ow for the CHR Michelsen Institute (Development 
Studies and Human Rights), the committee system in Namibia, much like the parliamentary rules and 
procedures there, takes place on an ad-hoc basis. 12 Procedures of the legislative branch have largely 
10Telefax communication: Carl F. Troy, 9 May 1995. 
11NDI Namibia Briefing Paper, p. 13. 
12Interview: Richard Moorsom, Cape Town, 15 May 1995. 
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evolved over time, with members learning and changing the rules as the need arises. 13 
Private Member's Bill 
The Namibian Constitution, however, does make provision for a Private Member's Bill14 which could 
be more effectively utilised by the opposition parties. This article allows non-Cabinet members of 
the National Assembly to introduce a bill, provided it is supported by one-third of all Assembly 
members. The combined seats of all opposition parties in the First Parliament represented over one-
third of the all National Assembly members; therefore, there was some scope for the Opposition to 
table bills in the legislative body. Although there is little chance that Private Member's Bills will be 
passed by the Assembly, they offer a good opportunity for the opposition parties to gain a voice in 
the policy-making process, and perhaps most importantly for their growth, to show an alternative 
position to the electorate. As Moses Katjiuongua has pointed out: 
... even though the bill might not succeed, we as opposition can say, okay, let's talk 
about education, unemployment, about health service, about social security, those 
issues. We could say, okay, let's develop a common position and introduce a motion 
on the floor of the House, as opposition parties. At least the public out there will see 
that we have a vision, some direction in which we want to go, even if we don't have 
the votes. 15 
State Information 
Neither the Constitution nor the National Assembly's standing rules and orders make any provision 
for opposition party access to state information, 16 which can be a vital tool for the Opposition. 
Denial of state information helps contribute to a less-informed Opposition, which often manifests 
13This is very different from the South African case, in which the rules and orders were worked out as part of the 
negotiated settlement; procedures there are not flexible as in Namibia. 
14The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 60 (2), p. 35. 
15Interview: Moses Katjiuongua, Windhoek, 24 March 1995. 
16This includes such material as government statistics, information regarding policy formulation and committee 
meeting reports -- all information which could help opposition parties understand more fully the needs and realities of the 
country and thereby formulate clearer policies. Access to information also aids opposition parties in criticising the 
government, because it gives them the transparency necessary to know the actions of the ruling party. 
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itself in uninformed or absent alternative policy formulations. The oilly guaranteed means that 
opposition party members have to state information, outside of the controlled question and answer 
sessions which take place at the start of each Assembly sitting, 17 are through committee meeting 
subpoenas of government officials. 18 Since there are so few committees, this is hardly a consistent 
source of information for the opposition parties. One of the most important institutional structures 
for the loyal Opposition in a majoritarian parliamentary system is guaranteed access to state 
information; the lack of this provision in Namibia's political arena provides one reason for the failure 
of the opposition parties to manifest themselves. Denial of state information also indicates that the 
link between the executive and the opposition parties is very weak; the ruling party exhibits distrust 
of the Opposition by withholding information or making it difficult to obtain. 
Non-institutional provisions for effective Opposition 
There are few non-institutional provisions in the Namibian political arena which operate to increase 
either the numerical strength or the effective influence of the opposition parties. During election 
campaigns all political parties are granted equal time on the national radio and television stations; 
after the campaign has come to a close, this is no longer the case. The Namibian Broadcasting 
Company, however, does give daily summaries of parliamentary proceedings, which, if the 
Opposition is making a valuable contribution, and if the reporting is objective, could help the minority 
parties get word out that they are active, productive and offer consistent policy alternatives m 
legislative debates. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The institutional shortcomings detailed above highlight some of the difficulties which the opposition 
17 "Rule 38: Questions, Any Private member may address a question to a Minister relating to a public matter for 
which he/she is responsible, either seeking information on such matter, or asking for official action with regard to it." 
National Assembly of the Republic of Namibia, Standing Rules and Orders. p. 16. 
18"For the purposes of exercising its powers and performing its fi.mctions any committee of the National Assembly ... 
shall have the power to subpena persons to appear before it to give evidence on oath and to produce any documents required 
by it." The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 59 (3), pp. 34-35. 
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parties face in their attempts to influence policy. The confusion and unpredictability surrounding 
aspects of parliamentary proceedings in Namibia are significant in limiting the effectiveness of the 
Opposition. This chapter has featured the formal political arena and structures for opposition 
politics; it has focused on some of the possible tangible limiting factors in the Namibian political 
arena. There are, however, other factors which shape the opposition parties' role and sphere of 
influence. Issues of an organisational nature and socio-cultural realities in Namibia are explored in 
chapters four and five. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LEGISLATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OPPOSITION 
Over the first five years of independence the opposition parties have declined in electoral strength, 
losing a significant number of seats in the Second Parliament. During the parliamentary sessions they 
cannot increase their seat representation; however, the opposition parties might be able to gain 
greater influence in the Namibian Parliament based on participation in Cabinet, on committees, and 
their contributions in the National Assembly. Based on the structural realities of the Namibian 
political arena, how have the opposition parties fared in shaping legislation? Have the opposition 
parties managed to use the Parliament as an effective sounding-board for their views? Have they 
managed to critique the government effectively and to provide alternatives? 
This chapter examines the influence of the Opposition in various policy-making domains: 1) the 
National Assembly, 2) the Cabinet and 3) in committees. There are essentially two parts to this 
analysis. One involves a listing of positions which opposition party members maintain in the Cabinet, 
where policy is initiated for the most part. 1 Given that the ruling party is not constitutionally 
mandated to give such positions to the Opposition, the minority parties are limited in their influence 
in this domain by the whim of SW APO. The second part involves both a quantitative and, perhaps 
more significantly, a qualitative analysis of opposition party performance in the National Assembly --
which is their only guaranteed arena for expression. 
THE CABINET 
When SW APO gained power in 1989 the international and the domestic communities commended 
the ruling party for its inclusion ofnon-SWAPO members in Namibia's first Cabinet, comprised of 
sixteen ministries. The DTA refused any Cabinet position, preferring to adopt a strict role as Official 
Opposition. 2 SW APO awarded the Deputy-Ministership of Justice to the NNF's Advocate Vekuii 
1Within a parliamentary system legislative committees can have a significant role in shaping policy; 
an close examination of Namibia's committee system, therefore, would help explain the role of the Opposition in policy 
making. Unfortunately, as the committees system is very undeveloped, and the rules and orders for establishing and 
appointing committees have been utilised on an ad-hoc basis in the First Parliament, concrete information on committees 
-- what they are, who sits on them, who chairs them, what they discuss, etc -- has not been available. 
2 Although the DT A refused Cabinet seats in favour of becoming the Official Opposition, this chapter will 
illustrate that the party performed relatively poorly in that role. The DT A might have gained much greater influence 
if its members had taken up positions in Cabinet. 
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Rukoro, and the Deputy-Ministership of Trade and Industry to the UDF's Mr. Reggie Diergaardt. 
The Ministry of Finance and The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Water and Rural Development 
went to two members of the general business community, not party-political members: Dr. Otto 
Herrigel and Mr. Gerhard Hanekom respectively. 
By the fourth session of the National Assembly, October 15 - 18 November, 1991, the Cabinet had 
expanded to eighteen ministries - with positions filled entirely by SW AP·o members. 3 At this time 
there were a number of Cabinet reshuflles, but posts were shared among members of the ruling party 
or the two non-party community members; no additional ministry positions were offered to 
opposition party members. By the seventh session, 1 - 23 February, 1994, the Cabinet contained no 
opposition party members: the UDF's Diergaardt was out4 and the NNF's Advocate V. Rukoro had 
vacated his seat in Parliament to fellow UDF member Mr. Gerson Veii, though he retained his 
position as Deputy Minister of Justice. 
Percentage of Party Representation in National Assembly vs. Cabinet 
First Parliament 
SWAPO S1'.llt'S 
Representation in NA 
Cabinet Representation 
March 1990 - January 1994 
Cabinet Representation 
February 1994 - March 1995 
3The Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport became two ministries: Ministry of Education and 
Culture and Ministry of Youth and Sport. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Water and Rural Development split 
into the Ministry of the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural and Water Development and the Ministry ofFisheries and Marine 
Resources. Hansard, (Vol 15). 
4niergaardt resigned from the UDF, vacating his seat in the National Assembly. His cabinet position was not 
filled with another UDF member. 
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..... 
Relative to their representation in Parliament, opposition members' Cabinet representation is weak. 
The first Cabinet of the First Session of the National Assembly contained thirty-two appointable 
positions, excluding the Prime Minister, including sixteen Ministers and fifteen deputy-ministers and 
a deputy minister in the Office of the President. Of these thirty-two positions, SW APO members 
held twenty-seven, or 84% of cabinet seats. The UDF held one seat, or 3% of total cabinet 
positions. The NNF held 1 seat, or 3% of total cabinet positions. The two remaining positions were 
held by non-party members, representing 6% of the Cabinet. Given that SW APO gained 57% of the 
total vote, the party's representation in Cabinet, 84%, is substantial; the UDF gained 5.5% of total 
national votes and 3% of the Cabinet seats; the NNF won 1.4% of the vote and 3% of Cabinet 
positions. 
Somewhat in the mode of consociationalism, SW APO gave Cabinet positions to two of the 
opposition parties. However, since the ruling party was not under mandate to include opposition 
members in the Cabinet, especially not in proportion to their seats in the National Assembly, SW APO 
retained the greatest percentage of Cab.inet positions for itself It is important to stress, similarly, 
that the positions awarded to opposition members in the Cabinet were all deputy-ministerships -- no 
ministerships went to the Opposition. Although deputy ministers form part of the Cabinet, their 
position is significantly less powerful and less influential than the position of minister. It must also 
be remembered that by the end of the First Parliament, neither the UDF nor the NNF retained 
Cabinet seats. 
Since legislation is generally initiated by the various ministries, with the exception of the Private 
Member's Bill, influence in Cabinet is an important source of over-all party strength in policy-making. 
Given the overwhelming dominance of the ruling party in Cabinet, the seats held by the Opposition 
were more token measures of nation-building on the part of SW APO than any real indication of 
encouraging opposition party influence in the development oflegislation. 
COMMITTEES AND SUB-COMMITTEES 
Given the insignificant representation of opposition party members in Cabinet they can exert very little 
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influence in the executive domain -- this is in keeping with the majoritarian parliamentary model of 
democracy. However, there is a chance that opposition representation in committees would boost 
their opportunities to shape policy legislation. Committees -- standing and select - - and sub-
committees are an important part of the legislative process in most democratic systems. Cabinet 
members introduce bills into the Parliament. All members then debate the bill, and opposition 
members have an opportunity to move amendments. However, if a general policy suggestion is 
referred to committee, legislation is either completely initiated at committee stage, as in the case of 
motions for select committees to investigate policy for a particular concern, or greatly fine-tuned as 
in the case of existing bills referred to committee for report. If opposition party members have wide 
access to committees and especially if the opposition holds chairs on committees and sub-committees, 
their influence in policy-legislation could be significant. Unfortunately for the opposition parties there 
were very few operational committees during the First Parliament; and, as detailed in chapter three, 
there was little standardisation on the appointment of committees. The Secretary of the National 
Assembly was not able to provide information on the First Parliament's committees: what they were, 
who sat on them and who chaired them. Interviews in the following chapter indicate that the 
opposition parties did not play a significant role in the First Parliament's committee system. 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
The opposition parties, taken all together, did not have the numbers in the National Assembly to 
overturn simple majority votes by the ruling party. They had the numbers, if voting in bloc, to affect 
voting where a two-thirds majority was necessary: in the case of the National Council rejecting a bill 
on principle the National Assembly is required to pass it with a two-thirds majority. However, with 
SW APO making up 73% of the National Council, there was very little chance that the National 
Council would reject the ruling party's directives from the Assembly. As the following two chapters 
point out, there was, furthermore, little caucusing on the part of the opposition parties in the first 
Parliament; the parties were not able to consistently present a unified voice, nor to vote in a similar 
manner. 
Despite a numerical inability to have a significant effect on policy-making in either the legislative or 
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the executive branches, the Opposition can gain influence in other manners. Given the theoretical 
role of the Opposition in a majoritarian parliamentary system, the opposition parties can play a 
significant role in the legislative bodies by presenting constructive criticism of the ruling party, 
suggesting policy alternatives, and by checking abuses by the government. The main means of 
fulfilling these roles is through effective debate and questions in parliament, and the recommendation 
of amendments to a bill. Thus, through both a quantitatively and qualitatively strong participation 
in the proceedings of the legislature the opposition parties are fulfilling part of their role in parliament. 
In the following sections of this chapter I will quantitatively and qualitatively examine the record of 
the Namibian Opposition -- did they fulfill the more limited role available to them in the First 
Parliament? 
One way of approaching a quantitative analysis of Opposition participation in the National Assembly 
can be made by counting the number of questions asked by opposition party members in relation to 
the total number of questions asked. Although this by no means offers a complete determinant of 
opposition participation and effort, questions help to indicate which opposition parties make a 
concerted effort to use the available means of having a voice in parliament. 5 Insight into this part of 
the opposition role in Parliament is offered by Helen Suzman, long time lone opposition Progressive 
Party member in the South African Parliament: "I ask hundreds of questions in this House and I solicit 
information from honourable ministers not for any sinister purpose ... Let me say that if as a result of 
these facts being used, certain situations in South Africa are duly improved, I think one has 
accomplished something ... I am going to continued on these lines, because this is one of my duties 
as a member of Parliament. "6 An equally significant judgment of Opposition participation in the 
National Assembly involves a qualitative analysis of their contributions therein; therefore, in the 
second part of this analysis I will offer a critical qualitative evaluation of opposition party 
participation on debate of a controversial bill. 
5"Any private member may address a question to a Minister relating to a public matter for which he/she is 
responsible, either seeking information on such matter, or asking for official action with regard to it." (Rule 38) The 
National Assembly of the Republic of Namibia, Standing Rules and Orders, p. 16. 




For the purpose of counting questions asked and studying the contribution of the Opposition on 
significant bills in the Namibian National Assembly I utilised Hansard. For a quantitative analysis 
of questions I used all five years of Hansards covering a period from March 21, 1990 through 
October 28, 1994.7 The qualitative analysis is based on debates in Hansard Vol. 40-42. All 
references will be cited as Hansard; the volume and page numbers will be indicated in the text. 
Questions counted were only the formal questions as indexed in Hansard, either to a Minister, or to 
the Prime Minister or President during their addresses to the Assembly. Questions as interruptions 
to a debate were not included in the measurement. Where sub-questions were included within a 
formal question, these were counted separately as long as they represented an inquiry for different 
information than the main question, rather than a rephrasing of the main question. 
Statistics 
The number of questions asked by each party has been calculated by counting the entire number of 
questions asked by members of each party for the five years of the First Parliament and dividing that 
by the total number of questions in the Hansard transcripts, 877. The following chart illustrates the 
percentage of total questions asked by each party in the National Assembly relative to percentage 
representation in the Assembly. 
Percentage of Party Representation in National Assembly vs. Questions Asked 
First Parliament 
•Representation In NA 
Gauestions 
7Hansard, First Session -First Parliament through Ninth Session - First Parliament, Vol 1-42. 
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ANALYSING THE DATA 
Question sessions 
The above statistics reveal that some of the numerically small opposition parties participated in a 
much higher proportion than their seat representation in terms of questions in the National Assembly. 
The correlation between party representation in the Assembly and participation in legislative 
proceedings, therefore, is not wholly conclusive. The ACN, for instance, with three members, or 
4.2% of the Assembly seats, asked a total of 171 questions over five years, or 19.5% of all questions 
asked. Likewise, the NPF, with one member, or 1.4% of the seats, asked a total of 137 questions, 
or 15.6% of total questions. The DTA, with 29 % of Assembly seats, accounted for 508 questions, 
58%. On the other hand, the UDF, with four seats in the Assembly, 5.5% of the representative 
positions, asked considerably fewer questions than other smaller opposition parties; the UDF asked 
39 questions, representing 4.4% of the total. The poorest numerical showing in asking questions was 
the NNF, with one member, and only four questions asked, or .46% of the total. 
I partially attribute low rates of questioning from the NNF by their representation in the Cabinet. 
Until the seventh session of the National Assembly, the only member of the NNF with a seat in 
parliament was Advocate V. Rukoro, who held the cabinet position of Deputy Minister of Justice. 
During this time no questions were asked in the Assembly by the NNF, since, as a Cabinet member, 
Rukoro had access to state information and could ask any necessary questions in Cabinet meetings. 
The only questions which came from the NNF camp were made during the ninth session after 
Rukoro had left the party and was replaced by Veii, who was not in the Cabinet.. 
Similarly, for the UDF, low rates of questioning relative to numerical strength in the National 
Assembly can be somewhat understood in light of the party's cabinet position. With the greatest 
number of opposition seats in the Assembly, after the DT A, the UDF could be expected to participate 
more fully in formal questioning sessions; but a weak showing of 4.4% of total questions partially 
rests on the fact that for half of the First Parliament, only three UDF members occupied non-cabinet 
positions. 
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It is also important to note that SW APO did not ask any questions in the Assembly proceedings. As 
the government party, SW APO members were already guaranteed access to state informations and 
influence in policy-making. Unlike the opposition parties, the ruling party members generally do not 
utilise question sessions to garner information or to maintain pressure on the government. 
The great majority of all questions asked by the Opposition during formal question sessions 
throughout the five years I have analysed were valuable and constructive inquiries. The opposition 
parties were generally effective in utilising question sessions to obtain state information and to 
indirectly critique the Government 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, a quantitative analysis of Opposition participation in the 
First Parliament is not alone indicative of the role played by the opposition parties. I now turn to a 
qualitative analysis based on a case study of debate of a controversial bill. 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPPOSITION PARTICIPATION BASED ON CASE 
STUDY 
The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Bill 
In September of 1994, during the National Assembly's Ninth Session, the Minister of Lands, 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Mr. R. Kapelwa, introduced the Agricultural (Commercial) Land 
Bill. Land redistribution being one of the most contentious issues in Namibia, all political parties 
were deeply involved in the debate surrounding this bill. To further understand and judge the role 
which the opposition parties have taken and fulfilled in the First Parliament I will make a qualitative 
evaluation of their participation. Here I am not concerned so much with the amount of debate time 
taken up by the opposition parties; rather, I am interested in the quality of their contribution: are their 
SSW APO members filled the majority of Cabinet positions in the First Parliament, giving them unlimited access 
to information. 
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speeches rational rather than purely emotive;9 do they offer plausible alternatives and concrete 
suggestions for amendments -- in other words, are they constructive players in this aspect of the 
opposition political sphere? I will also comment on the amendments offered by opposition members, 
indicating whether or not they were accepted into the final draft of the bill. Equally important as part 
of the broader analysis of the space available to the Opposition in Namibia's political arena is a 
commentary on ruling party participation in the debate: the attitudes displayed by SW APO Members 
of Parliament provide an indication of the ruling party's willingness to accept and even encourage 
Opposition as part of a consolidated democracy. 
Throughout the debate on the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Bill, which spanned two months, the 
opposition parties generally displayed an impressive debate record. In the face of emotionally worded 
appeals, a barrage of insults and consistent threats by ruling party Members of Parliament, including 
the Minister of Justice, the Opposition members on the whole maintained an air of calm and 
thoughtful debate. Although all parties agreed to the principle of the bill, .supporting the need for 
some measure of land redistribution in Namibia, both the ACN's Mr. Pretorius and the FCN's Mr. 
Conradie consistently presented legal arguments against the procedures laid out in the bill. 
Pretorius argued that the manner in which the bill set out redistribution in terms of affirmative action 
based on colour would offend the Constitution. Presenting his opposition to the bill largely in legal 
terms, Pretorius tackled an extremely unpopular position calmly. He also made plausible suggestions, 
for instance, that the bill on land and agricultural policy be accompanied by legislation on water, the 
environment, communal land and traditional authorities. At one stage Pretorius, arguing from a 
historical perspective, suggested that redistribution as set out in the bill rested on unsolid ground 
because land had never been stolen from people in Namibia: " .. .it is a matter of fact that 
notwithstanding my research over years, I could not find a single example where under the guiding 
eye of the League of Nations land was stolen from anybody or that legislation existed which denied 
9Emotive appeals have a place in National Assembly speech-making. Yet, even a cursory examination of 
Namibian National Assembly debates illustrates that in most instances the purely emotional appeals lack factual basis or 
constructive suggestions. If the Opposition is to consistently perform a constructive role in the legislature, opposition 
members must effectively critique the Government and offer plausible policy alternatives. 
30 
anybody on the basis of colour to buy commercial land in Namibia. "(Hansard Vol. 40, p. 59) 
Another unpopular position was taken up by Mr. Conradie, who insisted that the bill went against the 
individual rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter Three and in Article 16 of the Namibian 
Constitution. In much the same vein as Pretorius, Conradie made point by point legal arguments 
against the bill, though he stood by the principle ofland redistribution. (Hansard Vol. 41, p. 141) He 
made a poignant observation regarding the bill, which was later echoed by other opposition party 
members and was given some consideration in the final draft of the bill: "It is highly unfair, Mr. 
Speaker, that the members of a body which is required to advise on any decision to be taken by the 
Minister and which may adversely affect the rights of the persons interested in such decision or to 
pronounce upon decisions taken by the Minister, should be appointed by the Minister who is to take 
such decisions, or by any other functionary of the State." 10 (Hansard Vol. 41, p. 173) 
The ACN's Verster supported the bill . in principle, but recorninended a number of changes in the 
process. Foremost, Verster suggested that the land bill go before a select committee of the Assembly, 
especially to look into issues such as ecology, training for new farmers when land is redistributed, and 
sustainable development. Although his party colleague, Pretorius, had received numerous verbal 
insults from the Assembly during the debate, Verster did not present a uniquely partisan view, or 
attempt to defend Pretorius. Rather, seeming like a voice of reason in a sea of anger, Verster 
explained his more even-minded approach to the debate: "Mr. Speaker, what has been said in this 
House during the debate, especially by senior members of the ruling party, might justify retaliation. 
But because they have spoken from the hearts and it is an emotional issue, I do not feel compelled 
to retaliate. I shall let it pass." (Hansard Vol. 41, p. 243) Further, he points out that " .... if all of us 
would indulge in such debating, such mud-throwing and accusations, justifiable or not, Sir, an 
acceptable Land Reform Bill will never see the light during this session." (p. 243) Responding to 
continual threats to the Opposition by the ruling party, Verster said, "Mr. Speaker, Members, if 
10Here Conradie is suggesting that the Advisory Committee should be both more transparent and more 
democratically appointed. He suggests that the committee which is to advise the Ministry on land redistribution should not 
be appointed by said Ministry. 
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further threats that land can be confiscated are thrown at random across this floor, we are in for 
trouble." (p. 243) 
Similarly the UDF's Mr. E. Biwa agreed in principle but offered improvements to the bill. His advice 
was non-emotive and sound. For instance, Biwa recommended that the issue of communal land be 
tackled simultaneously to the commercial land bill. He also suggested that institutions and measures 
be implemented by the bill which will ensure the continued agricultural development of land which 
is redistributed i.e. support structures for new farmers and the accessibility of farming equipment. 
Biwa also indicated specific proposals for part of the bill: he calls on the government to define the 
term "under-utilised" in Part 2, section 14 (3) (a) as well as the term "excessive land" in Part 2, 
section 14 (2) (c). (Hansard Vol. 41, p. 70) Further advancing a rational debate, Biwa inquired 
whether or not the government could finance the provisions in the bill for land redistribution, and also 
why the Land Bank of Namibia plays such an insignificant role in the bill. 
Likewise advancing concrete proposals on the part of the UDF, party leader Justus Garoeb 
recommended the substitution of "economic unit" for "farming unit" in the interests of clarification. 
Garoeb also suggested an amendment to Part I, Section 3, subsection (2), such that the Advisory 
Commission on Land, as set out in the bill, shall only comply with directives from the sponsoring 
Minister at its own discretion -- this in the interest of giving the Commission greater independence 
and greater transparency. (Hansard Vol. 42, p. 101) 
The Official Opposition, though presenting some solid proposals for improvement in the bill, did not 
fare nearly as well as the significantly smaller opposition parties. Arguments presented by DTA 
members were less solid and premised much more on emotional appeals than those offered by the 
other opposition parties. Mr. Mwilima's speech, for instance, did not offer any real alternatives or 
any concrete references to clauses in the bill, but rather vaguely touches on ideas within the bill. He 
commented that the productivity of farmland must be continued, but offers no changes to the bill to 
follow this argument. A typical example of what Mwilima said is "Mr. Speaker, when things go 
wrong with the farmer in this country, it will without exception have a snowball effect." (Hansard 
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Vol. 41, p. 73) Mr. Kaura, furthermore, made the main premise of his speech the suggestion that 
the Namibian government call upon the Contact Group members to finance much of the land bill. He 
argued that because these members of the international community insisted that the independent 
Namibian Government uphold the principle of just compensation, they should help foot the bill of 
land redistribution. (Hansard Vol. 41, p. 88) 
The best example of ineffective DTA speech-making came from the party leader, Mr. Muyongo. 
Keeping with tradition, Muyongo made an impassioned speech mainly in favour of the bill; yet, he 
had little of real value to add to the debate and certainly no concrete suggestions. For instance: " ... 
I want to appeal to those commercial farmers to accept the fact that land redressing has to be done, 
not for the sake of getting at them, but for the sake for affording every citizen the right upon land and 
to utilize it for his or her own good. This bill should not be seen as trying to victimize the commercial 
farmers, but to try and say to them, share with your fellow citizens what you have in excess and what 
you want to sell in the spirit of national reconciliation." (Hansard Vol. 42, p. 134) 
The DTA's Mr. Moongo, however, did make several valid recommendations in his brief speech on 
the land bill. He suggested that land redistribution be premised on the effective utilisation of scarce 
land resources -- rather than ensuring ownership by the largest number of people, the bill should 
ensure that only those capable to using the land productively have access to it. As a further means 
of boosting the productivity of the land Moongo recommended that the government institute a 
program of agricultural and agrarian science for farmers. (Hansard Vol. 42, p. 131) 
Mr. Veii of the NNF also presented level-headed alternatives and recommendations for the 
improvement of the land bill. Veii, in fact, was the first Member of Parliament to suggest that an 
independent commission be established as part of the land bill, rather than the Ministry appointed 
Land Reform Advisory Commission which is set out in the bill. "... we don't have trust and 
confidence inn the Ministry to be the sole implementing agency for land redistribution. The Ministry 
has proved incapable of dealing with this very sensitive issue. So far the land acquired by the state 
for resettlement had been given to party members and party supporters." (Hansard Vol. 41, p. 87) 
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Veii's speech and his recommendations represent a prime example of opposition fulfilment of a 
watchdog role on government. 
Perhaps the best example of Opposition participation in the land bill debate came from the NPF's Mr. 
Katjiuongua. Imploring the Assembly members to comport themselves in a manner more befitting 
parliamentarians, he suggested that the members leave history behind and rather look for feasible 
solutions to the problem as it stands currently. Arguing rationally and in a calm manner, 
Katjioungua gave valid recommendations. He supported Veii's suggestion for an independent 
national land reform commission; he also recommended use of existing institutions for processing land 
claims, etc, in the interests of avoiding over-bureaucratization. Katjiuongua further called for a 
programme for provision of extension services for new farm owners. All of Katjiuongua's 
recommendations are elaborated upon with necessary detail: "A national reform commission, 
independent, appointed by Parliament and working with existing financial institutions or agricultural 
institutions. While the commission itself will ensure accountability and transparency and 
representivity, the financial institutions and others will provide the expertise. The commission will 
have two vital functions: to organise resources, to determine first of all what land there is, where 
does it lie, and to mobilise resources to make sure that the land comes for redistribution." (Hansard 
Vol. 41, p. 247) What is most remarkable about Katjioungua's contributions is their steady, 
consistently rational arguments -- his ability to stay clear of purely partisan debate in the House and 
maintain a steadfast commitment to offering solid policy alternatives. Katjiuongua was also 
consistent in supporting the rules, procedures and democratic nature of the Assembly; for instance, 
though he did not support the arguments of Conradie, he appeals to the House to stop interrupting 
Conradie: "On a point of order. Can the House stop interrupting as his time is running out." 
. (Hansard Vol. 41, p. 145) 
Given the support that all parties gave in principle to the bill, recommending changes of a relatively 
minor nature only, SW APO members' comportment during this debate was surprisingly aggressive 
and emotive. Mr. Nathaniel, consistent with his behaviour throughout most debates, constantly 
interjected during Opposition speeches. Likewise, his formal speeches were rifewith disorganised, 
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substantially unintelligible arguments; his most notable contribution throughout the land bill debate 
is to level condemnations at various opposition party members: " ... listen to me, I know better than 
you, you have been asked a serious question by the Minister of Home Affairs: Where is your 
apartheid regime now? Why did you lose your power? You go to church every morning, every 
afternoon, asking God: "What happened dat die Kaffir ons onder hul voete het? God rejected you, 
God told you, don't ask me a stupid question ... "(Hansard Vol. 41, p. 83) Furthermore, much of 
Nathaniel's debate in the Assembly illustrates a more authoritarian line within the SW APO camp; his 
insistent insults at opposing viewpoints and seeming inability to accept democratic debate, especially 
in light of a bill that is certain to pass, are a threatening undercurrent to the ruling party's moderation. 
For instance, he stated, "If there is anybody here who doesn't want what we want, the road is clear. 
Pack your bag, put it in a ship, put it in an aeroplane, put it on a train or your car and go away where 
you come from ... " (p. 83) To the discredit of the Speaker, Mr. Nathaniel's interjections and 
comments were rarely called out of order. 
The least acceptable behaviour throiighout this debate came from the ruling party's niiniste~s arid 
deputy ministers. The Minister of Justice, Dr. N. Tjiriange, refuted the arguments made by 
opposition party members, especially those of Pretorius and Conradie. In adversarial language, the 
Minister indicated that the ruling party has the power to and will indeed implement its policies, 
regardless of the wishes of others. He warned those who are opposed to certain features of the bill, 
"Change your ways while things are still calm. Our peoples' patience on these issues should not be 
mistaken for weakness." (Hansard Vol. 41, p. 137) And, " ... the next one is to liberate the land from 
those who have stolen it. We must have land distribution. Whether somebody wants it or not, that 
is coming and it will come." (Hansard Vol. 41, p. 141) The Minister of Justice was likewise adamant 
in his frequent accusations of Pretorius, insisting that Pretorius is presently living on land which was 
stolen from his forefathers by Pretorius' forefathers. Echoing Tjiriange's threats, the Minister of 
Labour and Human Resources Development exclaimed, "I wish to make it very clear to all parties 
concerned that, despite its policy of Christian reconciliation, the Government shall not hesitate to 
have recourse to alternative measures should the necessary cooperation of the owners of the land not 
be forthcoming." (Hansard Vol. 41, p. 185) 
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Despite the frequent, largely rational speeches made by the Opposition, and the numerous 
recommendations offered from that side of the House, the final draft of the land reform bill, 
completed in a Committee of the Whole Assembly, contained only one clause which had been 
partially altered to reflect the suggestions made by the opposition parties: the Advisory Commission 
on Land Reform was not made completely independent as the Opposition desired, but all members 
of said commission would be appointed by the Minister upon approval of the National Assembly. 
(Hansard Vol. 42, p. 210) The UDF's Biwa made a motion that Clause 4 be amended to more clearly 
define certain terms; this motion was rejected. The ACN's Verster later made an attempt to have 
discussion on Clause 21, which was ignored by the Speaker. (Hansard Vol. 42, p. 224) 
The contributions of the minority opposition party members throughout the land reform bill debate 
were impressive. Some of the more unpopular positions were rationally and calmly presented, even 
in the face of insulting interjections on the part of ruling party members. Much more so than the 
SW APO members, the opposition party Members of Parliament made well-organised, constructive 
contributions which mostly served to progress the debate. Many ruling party contributions, 
contrarily, seemed largely pointless, serving an adversarial purpose alone. Furthermore, opposition 
party members tended to call upon the House for reconciliatory debate and level-headed conversation, 
while the SW APO members tended to stoke the fires of conflict. Unfortunately, much of the debate 
by the Official Opposition was not nearly as effective as that from the smaller parties. As I have 
indicated above, the DT A members tend to make long, disorganised and unconstructive speeches, 
adding little to the overall effectiveness of the Opposition's participation in the National Assembly. 
This is surprising, given that, as the largest opposition party, the DTA has greater resources than the 
other parties, both financial and human; therefore, one would expect that their speeches would be 
better researched and their participation more concrete. 
Of course, a rational and level-headed approach to debate on controversial bills is not alone an 
indication that the Opposition is effective -- regardless of the speeches made by opposition members, 
their recommendations were not voted into effect in the final draft of the bill. In a strictly tangible 
manner, then, the opposition parties were ineffective in influencing -- at least at the draft bill stage --
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an important piece oflegislation. 11 In a less tangible sense, however, the Opposition was effective 
throughout the land reform debate. If two of the main objectives of a functioning Opposition in a 
majoritarian democratic system are to act as a watchdog on the Government and to present critical 
evaluations of ruling party policy, then some of the opposition parties fulfilled that role. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Given the limited means available to the opposition parties for a tangible effect on policy, this chapter 
indicates that the Opposition performed satisfactorily. In both a quantitative and a qualitative sense, 
the opposition parties expressed their views, playing a vocal role in the National Assembly. Yet, as 
noted at the beginning of the chapter, effective expression in the formal legislative chamber is only 
one manner in which the opposition parties prove themselves: vocal and constructive participation 
in the National Assembly by no means insures the Opposition influence in policy-making or increased 
electoral support in the next election. In the Namibian case, as this chapter has shown, this happens 
to be orie ·of the sole institutional means available to the Opposition to shape policy, given the 
absence of a tangible committee system. 
Despite active participation in the National Assembly, the opposition parties did not have much 
influence on policy in the First Parliament, nor did they attract more electoral support. Much of the 
reason for not affecting policy changes, as the following chapters will point out, lie with an inability 
to unify their parliamentary positions and institute bloc voting. So, though the Opposition parties 
performed a critical, watchdog role in the First Parliament, they were unable to manifest themselves 
as an alternative government, with distinct policy goals; though the Opposition is good at opposing 
government policy, it has been largely ineffectual in proposing alternative legislation. The following 
chapters discuss reasons for both the electoral demise of the Opposition and institutional, 
organisational and socio-cultural reasons for the inability of the Opposition to perform more than a 
watchdog role on the ruling party. 
11It is likely that opposition party members did have some influence over the original idea of the land reform bill,· 
perhaps through informal conversations and meetings with ruling party members and relevant ministers. Since there was 




INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPPOSITION WEAKNESS 
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
As indicated in chapter three, there are a number of institutional factors lacking in the Namibian 
political arena which could be instrumental in bolstering the Opposition. It is important to clarify 
here that I am dealing with two issues when addressing the need to bolster Namibia's opposition 
parties: the Opposition needs to grow both numerically and in legislative influence. In many 
respects these needs represent different sides of the same coin. As they grow in electoral strength 
opposition parties will gain greater legislative influence merely by virtue of increased parliamentary 
representation; and, in some respects, increased policy influence might engender greater electoral 
support -- if opposition parties are viewed as effective they will attract more votes. 1 
Based largely on personal interviews with opposition party leaders, political analysts and 
organisations working for the maintenance of opposition politics in Namibia, the following two 
chapters detail some of the reasons for the demise of the Opposition, both numerically and in 
legislative influence. Commentary on the validity of the given reasons will also be given, where 
appropriate. This chapter covers institutional shortcomings of the Namibian political sphere which 
play a role in limiting Opposition activity. Chapter five looks at other, non-institutional, causes for 
the decline of opposition politics: mainly internal, organisational failures on the part of the 
opposition parties and socio-economic and political realities in Namibian society. 
Levelling the Playing Field -- Funding and Other Resources 
One of the major institutional shortcomings of the Namibian political structure is an absence of 
funding for political parties. The opposition parties do not have the financial resources which are 
available to SW APO, in terms of member dues, outside donations and, as was pivotal in the 1994 
election, in terms of state resources -- vehicles, planes, media, etc. Indeed, there is a complete 
dearth of political.party legislation, which would place caps on party spending in elections, place 
limits on financial contributions from outside sources and perhaps even mandate disclosure by 
parties of their funding sources. There is also the possibility that party legislation would call for 
1 A largely ineffective DTA lost significant electoral support in elections for the Second Parliament. 
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state funding to parties. Without such legislation SW APO is significantly ahead of the opposition 
parties financially -- an enormous starting advantage in both campaigning and in constituency 
networking in inter-elections periods. 
In fact, the playing field for political parties in Namibia is almost wholly disparate between the 
ruling party and the smaller, opposition parties. Opposition party leaders point out that until the 
playing field is levelled, or at least made more level, there is little chance that the opposition parties 
will catch up with the support that SW APO now gamers; they will remain weak and the ruling 
party will grow in dominance. "Unless ... the playing field is levelled, so that we have equitable 
opportunities to campaign, to get our information across to the public and things like that, 
democracy will be undermined. "2 The ruling party has unlimited access to the resources of the 
state: campaigning members can take state vehicles, airplanes and helicopters to party rallies; state 
faxes, computers and telephones are at the disposal of SW APO; and the state newspaper has 
become essentially a ruling party mouthpiece moreso than a non-partisan state media service. 
The National Broadcasting Company (NBC), while tending to give much focus to the ruling party, 
is still regarded as largely objective. 3 The state has actually billed SW APO for use of state 
resources during last year's campaign period; however, that does not negate that fact that the 
ruling party had access to a myriad of state resources, resources which invariably put SW APO at 
the top of the playing field. 
There was significant debate surrounding the issue of state funding of political parties at the start 
of 1994, yet the issue seems to have slid off the table, without any positive progress as far as the 
opposition parties are concerned. Mishake Muyongo, leader of the DT A, points out that funding 
of the smaller, opposition parties is clearly not in the electoral interests of SW APO, especially 
since the ruling party would like to continue to increase its political dominance. 
2Interview: Moses Katjioungua, Windhoek, 24 March 1995. 
3Interview: Mary Elizabeth Johnson, Cape Town, 1 May 1995. 
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... they [SWAPO] say, why should we fund somebody who is one day going to 
overthrow us politically. If you keep him underfunded, the better, so that you keep 
on winning. This is the logic. To me it is very undemocratic . .". There is no way in out 
laws, or in the supreme law of the country, that only the ruling party has access to the 
resources during the campaign. The resources are supposed to be distributed evenly 
among the political parties that are partaking in an election. Just because the present 
people don't want the political parties in opposition to expand or to grow they try to 
refuse us these resources, so that we don't have access to the people. To reach 
everybody in this country you need resources whereby you put your message over the 
radio or you go there yourselves. And to reach every corner in Namibia you would 
definitely need resources in terms oftransport.4 
Yet, the issue of political party funding has not fully accepted even by individuals who 
wholeheartedly support a multi-party system. Some suggest, for instance, that financial hand outs 
to political parties may encourage the proliferation of opportunity seekers, who form a party in the 
interests of gaining the money forthcoming from the state. 5 
There is, likewise, scepticism that doling out state financial resources to political parties will 
guarantee the growth and influence of the Opposition. "An abundance of funding and/or financial 
resources would not have prevented the debacle prior to the deadline for registration of presidential 
candidates, when parties split, others broke away and promised presidential candidates were not 
registered. "6 
Leaders of the opposition parties have suggested that even if state funding of political parties is not 
forthcoming, a less controversial step might be to make the national broadcasting services 
independent of the state, or, as Katjioungua sees it, "independent of the government..." According 
to him, this would signify the abolition of the Ministry of Broadcasting and Information, and the 
establishment of independent radio and television stations, "so that the opposition can come across. "7. 
4Interview: Mishake Muyongo, Windhoek, 23 March 1995. 
5Gwen Lister, 'Political Perspective,' The Namibian, 3 June 1994, p. 6. 
6Editorial, 'Ways to give impetus to democracy,' The Namibian, 11 November 1994, p. 7. 
7Interview: Moses Katjioungua, Windhoek, 23 March 1995. 
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Access to Information 
Another major institutional failure confronting the opposition parties is the absence of guaranteed 
access to state information for all political parties. As previously noted, access to state information 
plays a significant role in allowing the Opposition to operate effectively vis-a-vis policy formulation 
and voting. In the Namibian political arena, however, the opposition parties have no guarantee that 
they will be able to gain necessary information. This is not to say that opposition Members of 
Parliament and their parties have no opportunities to ask questions, obtain answers, gather data; 
rather, the lack of guaranteed access can add difficulty and unnecessary time and effort to the 
gathering of information that is always readily available to the ruling party. 
The only guaranteed means which opposition parties have of gaining state information is through 
standing and select committees and sub-committees: ministerial representatives and other 
government officials can be brought to testify before the committees. Committees are also used by 
many parliaments to get a diverse range of opinions and interests on new bills and policy. However, 
since few committees are actually operational and few opposition members have been appointed to 
serve on them, access to information continues to be restricted. 
There have, according to the opposition leaders, been moves by their representatives in the National 
Assembly to pressure the Speaker to form more committees, in an effort to gain information and 
greater influence in policy legislation. Indeed, the NDI Namibia Briefing Paper indicates that the 
National Assembly Standing Committee on Rules and Procedures had plans to institute additional 
committees "with substantive specialties and to exercise policy oversight. "8 
Muyongo suggested that the refusal of the ruling party to set up means by which the opposition 
parties would be guaranteed access to state information indicates an unwillingness on the part of 
SW APO to accept the Opposition as an integral part of the Namibian political system. 
8NDI, Namibia Briefing Paper, p. 13. 
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You know, I have visited a number of European and American countries 
during my life and I have sat in their parliaments and I've talked to their 
executives ... And, I have seen how the executive takes the opposition into 
confidence when it comes to state matters. I am not saying that we are asking 
to be given the secrets of the state, but there is noting wrong with sharing 
information with us. After all, we are part of the system. 9 
In line with the lack of information available to opposition parties is the current absence of a 
functional, useful parliamentary library. Once the library is organised and operational it will 
hopefully provide a needed source of information, allowing Members of Parliament to research bills 
and make well-documented policy suggestions. Currently the United States funded NGO, the 
National Democratic Institute, is working on updating the Namibian Parliamentary Library, getting 
a librarian to run it, and then opening it fully to Members of Parliament. 
Electoral System 
The opposition parties do not frequently blame the electoral system for their small parliamentary 
numbers. The proportional-representation list system which is used to elect members to the National 
Assembly usually acts to help the smaller parties gain some representation in the legislative branch. 
This has been true in Namibia, especially in the 1994 elections in which both the DCN and MAG 
failed to reach the threshold number of votes needed to gain a seat -- they were given a seat each 
nonetheless. There is, however, beginning to be more debate regarding the need to alter the electoral 
system somewhat; most arguments in favour of revision suggest some type of a mixed system 
whereby a certain number ofNational Assembly members would be elected by the PR list system and 
the rest by a direct-vote constituency election. One recommendation has been to combine the 
National Assembly and the National Council, making the Assembly into a body of98 elected seats. 
The 26 Council seats would maintain their constituency based electoral process, while the 72 
Assembly seats would continue to be elected on the basis of proportional representation, party-list 
system. It is argued that in this scenario each of the 13 regions would continue to have direct 
representation, but it will be in the primary legislative chamber, the Assembly, because the Council, 
9Interview: Mishake Muyongo, Windhoek, 23 March 1995 
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It is uncertain whether or not such an alteration in Namibia's electoral system would 
benefit the opposition parties. Perhaps shifting the focus to constituency-based 
elections would tend to make them more issue-based, which the opposition parties 
believe would help them gain votes. Perhaps even more importantly are the 
implications for Assembly committees: if the National Assembly is expanded, as the 
first recommendation suggests, there will be a substantially larger pool from which 
to appoint parliamentary committees "which will not be dominated by deputy 
ministers [as is currently the case] who themselves are part of the executive branch 
of the government which the committees are supposed to monitor and close-
question. 12 
Directorate of Elections 
A final institutional failure to which the opposition leaders consistently pointed is the existing 
Directorate of Elections. This body organises and supervises national elections in the country. 
Operating as a government ministry, the Directorate of Elections is regarded by some opposition 
members as not a completely independent, non-partisan body like its counterpart in South Africa, the 
Independent Electoral Commission. Namibia needs an electoral body which is completely 
independent of the government, of the ruling party. Elections have been declared free and fair by 
the international community; 13 nonetheless, there is a feeling among opposition parties that the 
election activities, polling, counting, security of boxes, etc, are so intricately linked to SW APO that 
the electoral process cannot be considered completely non-partisan. Ac~ording to Muyongo, "our 
electoral system is not an independent thing ... its being directed from a minister's office and obviously 
that minister, belonging to a political party, would like to have the influence of his political party in 
the running of the whole thing." 14 The DT A is presently contesting the 1994 national elections in 
120pinion piece, deputy Justice minister, Vekuii Rukoro, 'Mixed Electoral System Favours Accountability,' 
The Namibian, 12 August 1994, p. 7. 
13The Namibian reports that both the Commonwealth Observer Group and Awepa (European Parliamentarians 
for Afrika) described the December elections as free and fair. The groups released a press statement following polling 
stating that "There was no evidence of systematic attempts to undermine the system and the secrecy of the ballot was 
assured." Chris Ndivanga, 'President pledges: people will decide,' The Namibian, 12 December 1994. p. 2. 
14Interview: Mishake Muyongo, Windhoek, 23 March 1995. 
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the federal court; the party believes that votes were miscounted in four northern regions. 15 
Muyongo explained that the DT A had anticipated an increase in the party's electoral support in last 
year's election, which was not borne out by the polling results. This, coupled with the manner in 
which the elections were handled, has led his party to believe that the polling was not fair. He 
complained that the returning officers (those bringing the polling boxes to counting centers), were 
all SWAPO members or SWAPO sympathizers. "The DTA, even ifwe were not going to form a 
government, we should have increased our majority in the house, but just because fraud was already 
built into the system, it was difficult to do this. "16 
Though there were irregularities in the December election, Muyongo's claims appear rather tenuous 
and reactionary: The December elections involved non-partisan observers from Egypt, Zimbabwe 
and European countries, as well as local diplomats currently serving in Namibia. The Namibian noted 
that observers would most likely be sent to less populous areas because the minority parties do not 
have the resources to post party agents in those areas. The newspaper also explained in a pre-election 
article that agents of political parties, not merely of the ruling party, would be allowed to accompany 
voting materials to and from polling stations. 17 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As this chapter has illustrated institutional factors play a significant role in defining the role available 
to opposition parties in the legislature and in setting the parameters for their electoral growth. 
Access to information and resources are important means of shaping effective and feasible policy; 
15The Electoral Directorate conducted an investigation into voting irregularities in the December 1994 
national elections. It found that although there were in fact more votes counted than registered voters in four constituencies 
in the North (Engela, Ogongo, Okatjali, and Oshikango ), this was not due to fraudulent behaviour. Rather the irregularities 
were most likely caused by voter confusion with the tendered polling situation, causing some to place tendered votes in a 
box not meant for tendered ballots. 'No Voter Fraud,' The Namibian, 21 December 1994, p. 3. 
16Interview: Mishake Muyongo, Windhoek, 23 March 1995. 
17'Nam poll preparations on schedule,' The Namibian, 21 October 1994, p. 3. 
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gaining the correct statistics and other background research is vital for the Opposition to propose 
concrete legislation. A level playing field during times of campaign, and perhaps even in inter-
election periods, is likewise valuable in increasing Opposition chances of gaining support. Finally, 
institutional factors such as the electoral system and the manner of carrying out polling are also 
instrumental in shaping the role of the Opposition and defining its place in the system. 
46 
CHAPTER VI 
INTERNAL/ORGANISATIONAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL REASONS FOR 
OPPOSITION WEAKNESS 
ORGANISATIONAL SHORTCOMINGS ON THE PART OF THE OPPOSITION 
Much of the blame for the current weakness of Namibia's opposition parties can be attributed to 
internal failures on their part. In addition to institutional factors, then, the Opposition is hampered 
by shortcomings that cannot be directly linked to the formal political structures. For instance, the 
failure of the opposition parties to establish shadow cabinets results in their not being able to be 
seriously considered as an "alternative government." Without this formal tool used by opposition 
parties within a parliamentary system, the Opposition does not organise and develop policy as if it 
were preparing to take-over the governing position. 1 
Alternative Policy Development? 
Directly linked to the absence of functioning shadow cabinets is the Opposition's inability to offer 
a clear alternative policy platform to the public. This is, perhaps, the most significant failure on the 
part of the opposition parties, and an important cause of their demise. Political analysts, newspaper 
editors, the ruling party, and even some of the opposition parties themselves realise this is one of 
their weaknesses. Most often they are accused of opposing merely for the sake of opposing, rather 
then suggesting coherent and plausible alternatives. As chapter three illustrated, however, the 
smaller opposition parties have been able to offer valid policy suggestions during debate on specific 
bills. Only the DTA was consistently unable, throughout the case study debate, to make specific 
suggestions -- unfortunately the DT A is the Official Opposition and, hence, numerically the largest 
opposition party. Thus, much of the criticism in this section is directed largely at the DT A. 
Likewise, though the case study showed the smaller opposition parties capable of offering alternative 
policy suggestions in debate, they are often unable to campaign on alternative policy platforms which 
are distinct from the ruling party. Ideological appeals and hapless critique of SW APO highlight 
Opposition campaigns. 
National Democratic Institute's Namibia Director, Erin Martin, for instance, explained that although 
10nly the DTA has the numbers to form a semi-complete shadow cabinet; and, as chapter four indicates, this 
has not been instrumental in helping the Official Opposition formulate concrete policy alternatives. 
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the opposition have been robust in their criticism against the government, they "have not been very 
strategic in how they criticised the government -- there is not a lot of logic or factual basis behind 
their attacks"2 Martin's comments refer in large part to the DT A Furthermore, the opposition parties 
must realise that criticism without alternatives will not sway voters in their favour: "SW APO has way 
too much support for someone to switch over to them just because they're getting criticism. "3 
NPF leader, Moses Katjiuongua, agrees that the Opposition has an important role to play in providing 
alternative policies to the electorate and to the Assembly; he also agrees that the parties have not 
consistently fulfilled this role: 
So the opposition has that role to play, not only to oppose for the sake of opposing, 
but to provide policy options. That has also been the difference between myself, or 
my party, and the DTA. The DTA says that everything is bad ... but they don't say at 
the end of the day ... this is what I would do should I come to power. And I think this 
has been the biggest problem of the opposition -- not to be seen to be providing 
policy options. 4 
DTA leader, Mishake Muyongo, however, contests the criticism levelled at his party. He insists that 
the DT A has consistently offered policy alternatives, but the suggestions are usually sidelined by the 
ruling party . 
... we have, from the very beginning, proposed alternatives. If those proposals are 
seen by the executive as useful they will not take them up immediately. They will 
leave them to lie for awhile. After a month or two they bring them back as if they are 
their own suggestions ... We realised that every time we suggested something in the 
course of our criticism it was found later on that it was brought back in the form of 
a white paper. 
And, UDF leader Chief Justus Garoeb offered a similar view: 
2Interview: Erin Martin, Windhoek, 23 March 1995. 
3Interview: Mary Elizabeth Johnson, Cape Town, 30 April 1995. 
4Interview: Moses Katjioungua, Windhoek, 23 March 1995. 
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... we have suggested alternative policy frameworks, but since we are but a minority 
in the National Assembly the ruling party did not take any of these proposals 
seriously. But one could see sort of a political strategy [on the part of the ruling 
party]. Some of the proposals made by the Opposition, which they [the government] 
have rejected are coming back through the back door of the ruling party as their own 
proposals. So we see at least we are doing something. 5 
There are, of course, instances in which the opposition parties have offered concrete policy 
suggestions and instances in which opposition members have brought important motions before the 
National Assembly -- the land reform law originated from a motion for a land conference brought 
by the NPF's Moses Katjioungua. 6 And, as evidenced in chapter three, the Opposition has had 
tenable, concrete suggestions on some issues. Similarly Katjioungua explained that he also brought 
a motion before the Assembly that all people of Namibian origin living outside of the country should 
be allowed to come back to Namibia at any time, without restrictions. This motion was unanimously 
accepted by the National Assembly. 
In many cases, however, opposition parties do not present a clear platform, either in Assembly 
debates or in campaign manifestos. Muyongo is correct in stating that the DT A offers much criticism 
and in the course of it the party may offer a suggestion, but there is rarely any clear policy formulation 
from the party. Opposition parties, as previously discussed, are indeed limited in their chances of 
initiating policy in Assembly or in affecting legislation via committee participation; however, they can 
put forth a specific program in manifestos, and especially at campaign time. The DT A in particular 
has received much criticism on this level; as the Official Opposition they are called upon, perhaps 
more than any other opposition party, to clarify and specify their particular policy alternatives. 
Gwen Lister, editor of The Namibian, criticised the DT A for its failure to elucidate real policies, to 
back up wordy manifestos with detailed plans, in the December 1994 national elections: 
5Interview: Chief Justus Garoeb, Windhoek, 29 March 1995. 
6Hansard, Vol. 1, p. 44. 
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... one would have hoped that positive solutions would be spelled out in party election 
manifestos, particularly that of the main opposition DT A, but this is not the case ... the 
DTA fails to impress with the principles they claim to stand for because they simply 
don't tell us how they would go about making them reality. 7 
Apparently, even obtaining specific information on the parties' policies was not an easy task. 
Individuals could attend party rallies and view party broadcasts on television and on the radio, but 
gaining access to party manifestos during the 1994 campaign appears to have been rather arduous. 
SW APO, given its high level of organisation and resources, printed a multitude of election manifestos 
in a wide range of Namibian languages. The DTA offered a manifesto in English and Afrikaans. 
Manifestos from the smaller parties, on the other hand, were less forthcoming. The DCN, given its 
late start, followed by the withdrawal of SW ANU from its ranks, provided an "elusive" manifesto; 
the UDF did not readily provide a published campaign platform; SW ANU was said to have 
duplicated their 1992 regional election manifesto; the individual who compiled this report said he 
could not trace the FCN; the Worker's Revolutionary Party did not have a complete manifesto at 
publication of the article; and the Monitor Action Group likewise had not made available a complete 
manifesto. "With five years to prepare for these elections the parties had ample time to develop 
distinctive policy platforms. What is surprising considering this is the thinness and predictability of 
most of the manifestos. "8 
Disunity Among Opposition Parties 
The opposition parties have, likewise, failed to unify their efforts. They have not amalgamated their 
power either during campaigning, in the form of coalitions, or during parliamentary sessions through 
caucusing. Leaders indicate that the opposition parties are unable to come together before elections 
because there is invariably a power-struggle among the various party leaders. Chief Justus Garoeb 
explained that he attempted to get the opposition parties together before last year's election, for 
instance, but this turned out to be an unattainable goal: " ... every political party seems to be sitting 
on its own island. They don't want to lose -- it's a little bit of a leadership squabble. Everybody wants 
7 Gwen Lister, 'Political Perspective,' The Namibian, 28 October 1994, p. 6. 
8Graham Hopwood, 'Do you really know what you're voting for?' The Namibian, 21 November 1994, p. 3. 
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to be a leader and the moment he merges with the other party to him it's quite a risk; so, he's afraid 
of losing his leadership. "9 
There had been efforts at coalition forming among several of the opposition parties before the 
December election; however, these efforts only partially materialised. For instance, in January of 
1994, there were suggestions by Nudo 10leader, ChiefKuaima Riruako, that talks between himself 
and Rehoboth Kaptein Hans Diergaardt and UDF leader Chief Justus Garoeb, would lead to an 
alliance in the elections. "An alliance with the two chiefs would prevent SW APO getting a two-thirds 
majority, Riruako said. "11 The alliance never formed. 
In June of 1994 the ACN, the NPF and SWANU formed the Democratic Coalition of Namibia 
(DCN).12 The DCN gained one seat in the Second Parliament. However, this coalition was a result 
of the breakdown of a coalition from the First Parliament: the NNF, which comprised four parties, 
SW ANU; the Namibian Independence Party (NIP); the Rehoboth Volksparty; and the United Namibia 
People's Party (UNPP). The NNF had occupied one seat in the National Assembly in the First 
Parliament. The NPF, likewise, had one seat in the First Parliament. The amalgamation of the NPF 
and the NNF did not result in additional seats; rather, the DCN occupies a single seat in the Second 
Parliament. This may be the result of the late withdrawal of SW ANU from the DCN alliance. 
Inability to Caucus 
Although it may be difficult for the opposition parties to form enduring coalitions, there is little 
excuse for their inability to caucus effectively during parliamentary sessions. The parties do not 
9Interview: Chief Justus Garoeb, Windhoek, 29 March 1995. 
1°Nudo belongs to the DTA. 
11JosefMotinga, 'Nudo returns to the DTA,' The Namibian, 7 April 1994, p. 3. 
12Also included at the outset of this coalition-building exercise were the UDF and the FCN. The UDF pulled 
out, stating that "any change of name and character of a party on the eve of very crucial elections might seriously 
jeopardise its chances of success." The FCN withdrew at the last minute because of alleged links with right-wing lawyer 
and leader of the Aksie-Vrye Volk, Daan Mostert. Chris Ndivanga, 'New political coalition to mount election 
challenge,' The Namibian, 30 June 1994, pp. 1-2. 
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meet and decide to take a common stance on an issue. They do not often agree to vote similarly in 
an effort to counter the majority of the ruling party. In the First Parliament there were six 
opposition parties represented, with a total of 31 out of 72 seats -- over 43% of the voting seats of 
the National Assembly were occupied by opposition members. If the opposition parties had practised 
more effective block voting, they could have exercised a great deal more influence than they did. For 
instance, a bill passes the National Assembly with a simple majority in favour, then goes onto the 
National Council for approval. If the National Council does not consent to the bill in its present form, 
and the National Assembly does not approve the amendments made therein, it must pass the 
Assembly, in its original form, by a two-thirds majority in order to override the Council's decision. 
Since the Opposition occupied enough seats to thwart SW APO's effort at a 2/3rds vote of the 
Assembly, it is feasible that the opposition parties could have overcome legislative dominance by the 
ruling party in some cases. 13 
But throughout the five years that have passed, nothing happened in that direction. 
It was a major failure on the part of the Opposition, that the Opposition could not 
develop a common cause. Very often on the floor of the house we vote differently. 
Some vote for the government, some abstain, some vote against and it's sort of, you 
know, a cocktail of behaviour. This also weakens our parliamentary position --
people not seeing that we can caucus ... then at least the public outside there will see 
that the Opposition, collectively speaking, has got a position. So at least that will 
project in the minds of the people, over a period of time, that the Opposition can 
work together, and if we work together during those stages we could have created 
the possibility of forming an alliance, but we kept on competing amongst ourselves 
and in the process, helping the ruling party. 14 
Garoeb agreed with Katjiuongua, suggesting that "if we [the Opposition] come together and decide 
how we will tackle the issues, then we have a much better chance of fighting the ruling party in the 
National Assembly. "15 
13 Although SW APO holds a majority in the National Council, members of that house are more influenced in 
their policy formulation by constituent needs than members of the Assembly since the Council seats are elected by a 
particular constituency. A further study might analysis the voting patterns of the parties in the National Council. 
14Interview: Moses Katjioungua, Windhoek, 23 March 1995. 
15Interview: Chief Justus Garoeb, Windhoek, 29 March 1995. 
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Katjioungua pointed out that because the Opposition numbers are reduced in the second parliament --
from 31 to 19 -- the quality of private members' contributions has to be even greater. With fewer 
voices in the National Assembly the opposition parties will have to make their debate time, their 
questions, all the more poignant -- and this will be aided by a more unified voice. 
There have been infrequent instances in which the opposition parties have managed to provide a 
collective voice, though with little legislative effect. For example in October of 1994 UDF M.P., Eric 
Biwa, introduced a motion in the Assembly on missing persons. The house was divided after Biwa's 
speech motivating the motion: all opposition members voted in favour of the motion, while SW APO 
opposed. The motion was subsequently defeated by SW APO's majority 26 votes to the opposition's 
17.16 
Although caucusing and unified voting are valuable Opposition strategies, they are not always 
feasible. There are ideological differences between some of the opposition parties which cause them 
to have vastly dissimilar viewpoints on some issues. For instance, the right-wing ACN voiced serious 
objections to wording on the Walvis Bay treaty which implied that the enclave was a historical and 
natural part ofNamibian territory; party leader, Pretorius, preferred that the treaty signify that South 
Africa was transferring the territory to Namibia, rather than stating that Namibia was reintegrating 
the enclave. The other, more left of center opposition parties, such as the DT A, the UDF and the 
NNF, would in no way support Pretorius' argument that historically the land at issue had legally 
belonged to South Africa. Unified positions and voting are not possible on all issues, due in large 
part to ideological differences; however, many issues offer an opportunity for the opposition parties 
to bloc vote or to support one another's' debate because the Opposition agrees to the policy in 
principle, such as the legislation on land reform. Furthermore, caucusing does not have to entail 
similar positions by the entire Opposition; if the largest opposition party, the DT A, brought one or 
two of the ideologically similar opposition parties into a caucusing session, the interests of unity 
16Tyappa Namutewa, 'Motion on detainees defeated in house,' The Namibian, 19 October 1994, p. 3. 
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would be served. 
SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS FOR OPPOSITION WEAKNESS 
In addition to institutional and internal factors which have proved limiting to the growth and influence 
of Namibia's opposition parties, socio-cultural facets of the country also seem to play a role in the 
demise of opposition politics. 
Ethnicity 
The role played by ethnicity is a contentious issue in Namibia. There is ongoing debate about the 
effect that ethnic affiliation has on voting patterns, and thus, on the consolidation of national political 
parties. 17 Understanding the degree to which ethnicity defines the electoral process in Namibia is 
extremely valuable (albeit very tricky) -- whether or not one believes that the Namibian electorate 
votes along ethnic lines or that a particular party gamers specifically ethnic support will set the 
prescriptive parameters for a consolidated multi-party democracy in the country. Opposition leaders 
tend to agree that the ethnic nature of Namibia's political sphere is integral to their inability to make 
inroads into the traditional SW APO areas. SW APO gamers most of its support from the country's 
Ovambo-speaking majority (nearly 60% of the population) . 
... the politics in this country ... is mostly based on an ethnic basis, that's why the ruling 
party has already a built-in majority of more than 50% because of its Ovambo-
speaking ethnic base -- which makes the opposition parties a little bit weaker. Before 
we even started campaigning, we have already lost more than 50% of the electorate. 18 
According to Potgieter, voting patterns for the 1989 elections distinctly follow an ethnic 
17See especially P.J.J.S. Potgieter, 'The Resolution 435 Election in Namibia,' Politikon, Vol. 18, no. 2, (June 
1991), pp. 26-48, andLindekeet. al. "Namibia's Election Revisited," Politikon, Vol. 19, no. 2, (June 1992), pp. 121-138. 
Also useful for a general summing up of numerous arguments on the ethnic factor in Namibian voting patterns 
is A Study on the Voting Behaviour in the 1992 Namibian Regional and Local Government Elections, Plus Election 
Statistics, prepared by Prof. Wade Pendelton et. al., University of Namibia, October 1993. 
18Interview: Chief Justus Garoeb, Windhoek, 29 March 1995. 
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configuration. He explains that SWAPO polled 92.3% of the vote in Ovambo. The party came first-
place in only nine out of twenty-three national polling districts. "This means, of course, that the 
SW APO victory was due primarily to massive support from the Ovambo and that its strength among 
the other population groups was rather thin. "19 He also explains that throughout the country parties 
gained support predominantly from particular ethnic groupings: The UDF gained 54.6% of the vote 
in Damaraland, while SWAPO polled only 26.8%; in Hereroland SWAPO gained 14.4% and in 
Kaokoland (home of Herero tribes) SWAPO again polled only 10%; in Nama majority areas, 
Mariental and Bethanie, the DTA polled 57% and 56% respectively, and SW APO gained 20%. 20 
Potgieter concludes from his statistics that while the Ovambo people "voted overwhelmingly in favour 
of SW APO ... most of the other population groups voted explicitly anti-SW APO. "21 Following his 
argument, then, if any of the opposition parties had been able to gain a degree of support among the 
Ovambo, they would have gained considerably more seats in the Constituent Assembly. Mishake 
Muyongo supports this view: 
... at the moment the political support in Namibia is very ethnic ... Its divided on ethnic 
lines. SWAPO, in 1989, they were saved from defeat by the support of the Ovambo 
in the North. 1994 they were saved by the same regions in Ovamboland. There are 
13 regions in this country. Ovambo has 4 out of 13. SW APO won these 4, then they 
won Kovango, which is neighbouring on them. Five regions. The rest were won by 
the DT A, but just because in these 8 regions which the DTA won the population were 
small, we were able to lose. That's it, its totally ethnic. Had we even managed to 
break through in Ovambo, even 20% or even 15%, the DTA would be running this 
country.22 
Lindeke et. al., however, refute Potgieter's argument; they insist, rather, that SW APO is not an 
ethnically based party, but one with a national platform and national appeal. They explain that 
although SW APO did gain most of its winning votes from Ovambo-speaking people, Potgieter has 
19Fotgieter, p. 34. 
20/bid, p. 35. 
21/bid, p. 44. 
22Interview: Mishake Muyongo, Windhoek, 23 March 1995. 
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undermined the significance of the party's support outside Ovambo. "He and others have suggested 
that the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DT A) won a majority of the 'election districts', and that this 
shows how weak SW APO was outside Ovambo areas. The evidence does not support this. "23 
The authors explain that SW APO gained a majority of votes cast in the country's third largest district, 
Kavango, as well as in Luderitz, Tsumeb and Swakopmund. In Damaraland, Grootfontein, 
Keetmanshoop, Okahandja, Caprivi, and Otjiwarongo, furthermore, SW APO obtained between 25 
to 40 per cent of the vote. The party did do poorly in Herero-speaking areas. Lindeke et. al., 
contend, moreover, that the districts used to compile voting data were arbitrary units: "Do political 
scientists really think that the nineteen hundred and ninety votes from Bethanie are equal in 
importance to the more than two hundred thousand votes from Ovambo? Eight of the districts had 
less than ten thousand total votes, fewer than needed to elect a single candidate. "24 
The authors argue that since tendered votes are not part of statistical analyses on ethnic voting 
patterns, the data is incomplete. They point out that SW APO won more than fifty thousand 'tendered' 
votes25; "Since these votes were not officially broken down according to districts, their inclusion 
could easily reverse the district outcomes and the assertions that SW APO lost in some of the districts 
assumed to have been won by the opposition. "26 
The various viewpoints in the ethnicity/voting pattern debate indicate the importance of the issue in 
determining the fairness of the elections and the political arena and in predicting the future success 
of consolidated majoritarian democracy in Namibia. As with all statistical analyses, data has been 
utilised to support a particular perspective; likewise, unavailable data, as pointed out by Lindeke et. 
al., could substantially alter one's understanding of the issue. There is little doubt that ethnic 
23Lindeke et. al, p. 128. 
24/bid, p. 129. 
25Tendered votes occur when a voter registered in one district casts his vote in another. 
26Lindeke et. al., p. 129. 
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affiliations factored into the 1989 election to some degree. 27 Whether or not the parties actually 
cultivated ethnic division is less clear. Also up for debate is the degree to which all the parties 
attempted to overcome ethically patterned political affiliation and develop broad national appeal after 
the founding election, in campaigning for both the 1992 Local and Regional Elections and the 1994 
national parliamentary and presidential election 
A group of political scientists have done a study on the 1992 elections, part of which attempts to 
analyze the ethnic nature of Namibian voting patterns. The survey illustrated that party loyalty was 
the primary reason for choice of vote among 85% of the respondents. The second strongest category 
for voter decision was support for an ethnic or racial group. The survey's authors, in explaining this 
data, point out that, "Within the post-apartheid context, it is difficult to separate voting on the basis 
of party loyalty from ethnic loyalty," because Namibia is a country in which particular parties 
dominate particular regions/population groups. 28 
However, the survey report indicates that voting appears to be moving away from an ethnic pattern: 
"The fact that the ruling party (SW APO) won in DTA strong holds in the South indicates the 
flexibility of voters as well as the ability of SW APO to convert the opposition. The results also 
indicate the inability of the opposition to win the votes of floating voters. "29 
There are presently no comprehensive studies on voting patterns in the 1994 elections available; 
however, polling details indicate that though SW APO once again won overwhelmingly in the northern 
areas, the party also gained substantial support in most constituencies. Furthermore, the DTA's defeat 
in the north was nowhere mirrored by SW APO outside of the Ovambo-speaking northern districts. 
27Even Lindeke et. al. concede that "ethnicity played an instrumental, rather than an independent role in the 
1989 elections as SW APO utilised strength in numbers of the Ovambo-speaking population to overthrow a repressive 
regime." Gerhard Totemeyer, 'Reflections on the Electoral Process,' in A Study of Voting Behaviour in the 1992 
Namibian Regional.and Local Government Elections, Plus Election Statistics. Prepared by Prof. Wade Pendelton et. 
al. for University of Namibia, October 1993. 
28Pendelton et. al., p. 18. 
29/bid. p. 19. 
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And, according to an editorial in The Namibian, "SW APO's support in areas outside Owambo cannot 
wholly be put down to Oshiwambo speakers who have moved south as the DT A would like to 
claim. 1130 
Although some of the Opposition leaders continue to blame ethnic voting patterns and the ethnic 
dominance of the ruling party on their inability to increase their electoral support, this is becoming 
an increasingly tenuous claim. Furthermore, many of the opposition parties have done little to 
overcome the ethnic tendencies of political affiliation in Namibia, despite complaints that it harms their 
growth potential. In fact, the opposition parties have often reinforced ethnic support patterns, 
because they are highly ethnically and tribally organised. 31 
Non-Issue Voting 
Another socio-cultural factor which the Opposition suggests operates against them is a politically 
undereducated population, and, following on this, non-issue based voting on the part of the majority 
of the electorate. SW APO is still carried by the symbolic appeal afforded a liberation movement; 
policy platforms are less important in gaining votes than ideological manifestos. It has also been 
argued that SWAPO's northern Ovambo support is not wholly ethnic; rather, it is very much a 
historical vote -- the north suffered as the main conflict zone during the war of liberation, and much 
of the population identify strongly with SW APO. On the contrary, the DTA continues to be 
regarded by many as a puppet of the colonial administration, something that will take time and faded 
memories to overcome.32 In fact, it is likely that the DTA's popularity will not augment until the party 
changes its name, its symbols and gets new leadership. Carrying this symbolic and ethnic voting 
pattern is a high illiteracy rate, 33 a highly rural populace with little access to forms of mass 
30'The Election and the Future of Democracy,' The Namibian, 11 November 1994, p. 7. 
31Editorial, 'Ways to give impetus to Democracy,' The Namibian, 11November1994, p. 7. 
32Editorial, 'The Election and the Future of Democracy,' The Namibian, 16 December 1994, p. 7. 
33Namibia's illiteracy rate is estimated at 2/3rds of the population. Jeffrey Balch and Jan Nico Scholten, 
'Namibian Reconstruction and National Reconciliation: Putting the Horse before the Cart,' Review of African Political 
Economy (ROAPE), No. 49 (Winter 1990), p. 86. 
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communication, and a relatively newly initiated democratic culture. Opposition parties, for instance, 
complain that norms of political tolerance that exist in functioning democracies do not always pervade 
the Namibian population: campaigning in SW APO strongholds, for instance, is sometimes risky for 
opposition parties. "They allege that SW APO encourages its supporters to 'use any means necessary' 
to disrupt and derail opposition parties from actively campaigning in the area. "34 
Opposition parties argue that they will have a greater advantage once the electorate identifies parties 
with specific policy platforms and begins voting on issues related to these platforms. Much of the 
responsibility for altering the elections to an issue-base lies with the political parties themselves. 
Smear campaigns, character defamations of opponents, and constant criticism of one another, which 
are practised by all Namibian political parties, are not helpful in building a political arena in which 
issues predominate. One example of the ruling party resisting a movement toward issue-based 
campaigns was President Nujoma's refusal to accept a pre-election debate with the DTA's presidential 
candidate, Mishake Muyongo. Muyongo challenged Nujoma to a debate, which the President 
declined: SW APO spokesperson, Ignatius Shihwameni, said that Nujorna declined on the grounds that 
Muyongo was "not in a position" to challenge the President. 35 The refusal to address serious issues 
in the form of a national debate appears to reinforce a culture of emotional, personalised politics. 
Civil Service 
De-politicisation of the civil service, another step in the direction of spreading the democratic culture, 
would be beneficial to opposition parties, they point out. The proposed Public Service Bill seeks to 
prohibit civil servants from holding office in any political party. It does not disallow membership in 
a political party, nor attendance of party meetings or other functions, but, rather, attempts to make 
civil servants less answerable to a party and more regarded as a servant of the state, not a particular 
government or party. SW APO members of the National Council took sides with the bill, suggesting 
that, among other disagreements, it was unconstitutional to ban civil servants from political activity. 
3"NDI, Namibia Briefing Paper 
350pinion letter, 'President Should Not Opt Out of Debate,' The Namibian, 18 November 1994, p. 8. 
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Asser Hango, SW APO member of the National Council, said he "did not believe in neutrality when 
it came to politics and ideological principles. °'36 
Opposition parties point out, however, that the Public Service Bill, in line with many western 
democracies such as the U.S. and Britain, would be a valuable tool in increasing their support. Chief 
Garoeb believes that many civil servants are unwilling to alter their allegiance and support one or the 
other opposition parties because they fear losing their jobs. He also claims that "to a certain extent, 
there is evidence that pressure is being exerted on these people by the ruling party, otherwise they 
might face losing their jobs ... and of course, people who are opting for the favours of the ruling party 
don't want to be associated with the opposition parties. 37 
Na tu re of Ruling Party 
A final socio-cultural concern noted by the opposition parties is what they call the undemocratic 
nature of SWAP0.38 SW APO is blamed for its lack of sincere desire to encourage a flourishing 
multi-party democracy in Namibia. Although SW APO cannot be held to account for its current two-
thirds parliamentary majority, critics suggest that the ruling party's campaign goal of such a majority 
is indicative of a growing tendency toward dominant party status. Throughout the formal 
campaigning period Nujoma called on the electorate to give SW APO a total win, claiming that the 
party would win all seats in the National Assembly. At SW APO's official launch in October 1994, 
President Nujoma "vowed that SW APO would sweep all 72 seat in the Parliamentary elections and 
that he would remain President. "39 This, according to Katjioungua, may suggest that SW APO is not 
36Tyappa Namutewa, 'Public Service Bill pounded,' The Namibian, 22 February 1995, p. 3. 
37Interview: Chief Justus Garoeb, Windhoek, 29 March 1995. 
38 SWAPO has a history of authoritarianism as a liberation movement. Since independence the opposition 
parties have consistently called upon the government to fully investigate what has become known as the 'detainee issue': 
"in exile hundreds of SW APO's own members were detained, starved, tortured or even killed, and their claims to a 
democratic voice in the movement were silenced." For more on the history of SW APO detentions and other examples 
of the party's non-democratic history during the liberation struggle, see Colin Leys and John S. Saul. Namibia's 
Liberation Srnggle, The Two-Edged Sword (London: James Currey Ltd., 1995). 
39Christof Maletsky, 'SW APO wants 'total power,' The Namibian, 31 October 1994, p. 3. 
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sincere about the proliferation of democracy in the country: 
They [SW APO] would like to see a semblance of opposition parties, to look 
democratic, but they do not want the Opposition to have such numbers or such weight 
or access to the public to have political significance as an Opposition ... when you have 
57% of the vote in the National Assembly and two-thirds in the National Council, what 
more mandate are you looking for? What is more solid than that when you have a 
democracy ... In Europe the governing party can be in power by one vote, and that's 
democracy -- so why is our government wanting to have everything by themselves? 
Its true that when you have a list of seventy-two people, you want to have all of them 
elected, but the point is that you say you want to win, but you don't say, I want to 
eliminate my opponents. 40 
SW APO has also been noted as highly intolerant in the face of criticism, a characteristic not befitting 
an image of promoting democratic values across the country, one of which is free speech and freedom 
to openly contest government policies. Gwen Lister explores this topic: "SW APO ... must stop 
equating criticism, however constructive, with being unpatriotic or with anti-government sentiments. 
That is absurd in the extreme and people must dispense of blind obedience to the ruling party.41 
The ruling party has also been noted for its exclusion of the other parties in government decision-
making. While it has had a consistent majority in Parliament the government still neglects to bring 
some policies before the legislative body for discussion with private members. A prime example of 
this was the government's decision to donate two million Namibian dollars to the campaign funds of 
the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress, without any parliamentary discussion 
on the issue. Opposition parties were excluded from a decision which bore the mark of the Namibian 
government, but which was actually a unilateral act by SW APO. Gwen Lister once again offers 
insight: "The ACN also protested on the grounds that it [the donation] had not been part of the 
approved budget. It would indeed be interesting to establish why this was not discussed beforehand 
by Parliament -- after all it was a contribution from the Government of Namibia and not the ruling 
40Interview: Moses Katjioungua, Windhoek, 23 March 1995. 
41Gwen Lister, 'Political Perspective,' The Namibian, 15 April 1994, p. 6. 
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I 
party -- and from which votes the money is to be allocated. "42 There was, likewise, much opposition 
in the National Assembly from the DTA, the NPF, and the NNF regarding the government's unilateral 
decision to enter in the United Nations, without any consultation with the legislative body.43 
A further indication that SW APO may be straying from its democratic platform is the increasingly 
personalistic role played by President Nujoma. He has been criticised for not setting limits and 
delegating authority to ministers and other government officials. Likewise, as an opinion piece in The 
Namibian points out, the President's office has been continually misused in a manner which entrenches 
an increasingly symbolic importance to Nujoma . 
. . . the head of state is not the one to open a radio station - that is the role of the 
Minister of Broadcasting and Information. The head of state is not the one to open 
a law department at the University of Namibia - that is the role of the Minister of 
Justice or the Chief Justice. The head of state is not the one to entertain young 
American Peace Corps volunteers - that is the role of the Minister of Education and 
Culture ... He is not the one to open a small road in the north - that is the role of the 
Minister of Transport. He is not the one to open agricultural projects and taste corn -
that is the role of the Minister of Agriculture. 44 
Furthermore, in his newest Cabinet Nujoma has himself taken over the Ministership of Home Affairs, 
in a professed effort to improve the law and order situation in the country. The portfolio of Home 
Affairs Minister includes the police. 45 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although the Opposition points to structural limitations of the system as a prime reason for their 
42Gwen Lister, 'Political Perspective,' The Namibian, 29 April 1994. p. 6. 
43 Hansard, Vol. 1, pp. 17-20. 
44Dr. Joseph Diescho, 'Namibia's Going the same way as Africa - the wrong way,' The Namibian, 3 June 
1994, p. 6. 
45Lucienne Fild, 'Reshuffie heralds major changes,' The Namibian, 22 March 1995, p. 3. 
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inability to gain substantial policy-making influence in the First Parliament, internal failures have also 
played a significant role. This chapter has illustrated that opposition parties did not caucus 
effectively, nor did they present alternative policy platforms. Caucusing is important for minority 
parties if they want to overcome the strong voting bloc of the ruling party; unified positions are 
equally important in providing an image to the public, as Katjioungua pointed out, that the Opposition 
has a vision and utilises limited means of implementing it. While caucusing is important during 
Parliament, for shaping policy, and during campaigns, for attracting support, presenting alternative 
policy platforms is vital at election time. I illustrate in chapter four that the opposition parties did 
suggest concrete alternatives to the proposed land reform bill, however, they have been largely 
ineffective in presenting campaign manifestos containing solid policies and means of implementation. 
Furthermore, the socio-cultural realities of Namibia have placed constraints on the ability of the 
opposition parties to grow in electoral strength. Ethnicity , non-issue voting and the rural and 
illiterate nature of much of the population combine to limit, to some degree, the capacity of the 
Opposition to attract new support. Yet, the socio-cultural realities should not force the opposition 
parties into the position of victim -- as much as they would suggest that these are somewhat static 
phenomenon, the opposition parties are in large part responsible for overcoming what are really 
dynamic factors. The Opposition, then, is largely responsible for presenting broad national policy 
platforms -- to gain wide appeal on the basis of issues, and for getting their message out to the rural 
and illiterate sectors of the population. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SCOPE FOR CHANGE 
There are a number of issues at hand when considering prescriptions for elevating the position of 
opposition parties in Namibia. Firstly it is important to keep in mind that encouraging the growth 
of the oppositiOn parties is an integral component of encouraging the consolidation of a multi-party 
system in the country. Secondly one must realise that the opposition parties must grow both 
numerically (not a proliferation of parties, per se, but an electoral growth within the parties) and in 
legislative influence. As noted previously these two goals enhance one another, and therefore, 
should be simultaneous and mutually reinforcing aims in any changes meant to reinforce opposition 
politics in Namibia. This chapter explores some of the possible alterations which could be made 
within both the formal political sphere as well as within the broader social context in an effort to 
enhance the opposition parties' opportunities for growth and influence. Furthermore, I explore non-
engineered processes which might affect the future of the Opposition. 
SYSTEMIC CHANGE 
System change is one method whereby the opposition parties may be able to gain a greater voice in 
actual policy-making. Systemic change involves more altering the electoral processes by establishing 
an independent electoral commission, or amending the electoral processes of the legislative body to 
some type of a mixed PR party-list and constituency based branch. Currently Namibia's political 
system is based on the concept of majoritarian democracy, in the mould of many traditional western 
democratic nations. However, recently there has been much debate concerning the merits of a 
consociational form of government for countries which are deemed 'ethnically divided.' Though a 
systemic change to consociationalism has not been seriously raised within Namibia, the opposition · 
parties which claim that Namibian politics continue to be highly ethnically motivated might consider 
the options offered within such a model. 
A consociational system can be effective in assuring a voice for the minority parties and groups, 
because minority rights are entrenched within a consociational constitution. Namibia's founding 
election brought to power an intended government of national unity -,. the ruling party, in principle, 
agreed to uphold national reconciliation and nation-building; but, SW APO was, in fact, under no 
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constitutional obligation to include opposing party members in the executive branch, nor in committee 
positions. SW APO did include minority members in a few cabinets positions, but since the DTA 
declined to take any ministerial posts -- preferring to maintain a strict role as Official Opposition --
the opposition parties were not represented in Cabinet or on committees in any proportion to their 
representation in the legislative body. 
If Namibia had chosen a consociational style of government the opposition parties might be 
represented in Cabinet posts and in committee positions in direct proportion to the number of votes 
they gained in the election. In such a system the majority party is under mandate to include the 
minority parties in the formation of the government. Hence, the minority parties do not become the 
Opposition -- they are part of the government and their input is thus theoretically integral to the 
effective functioning of the consociational government. In this manner, the minority voice gains 
access to the policy-making institutions of the government. 
As mentioned above, consociational democracy has been lauded by its proponents as the ideal system 
for an ethnically divided society. Because it entrenches power-sharing among the various parties 
within the constitution, consociationalism is meant to be a carefully engineered means of nation-
building and consensus politics. Arend Lijphart claims that in ethnically divided societies political 
instability tends to destroy efforts at democratisation. Therefore, consociational structures have been 
developed to stabilise such divided countries: "Consociational democracy means government by elite 
cartel designed to tum a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy. "1 
One of the possible drawbacks of a consociational model of democracy, as pointed out by Shapiro 
and Jung, and elucidated in chapter one, is the lack of institutional structures that exist for political 
opposition. Of course, this is in line with the model, which seeks to limit any outside opposition, and 
rather deal with conflicting opinions within the consensus, power-sharing government. However, 
since consociational models are often used in an effort to secure conflicting parties' participation in 
1 Arend Lijphart. 'Consociational Democracy,' World Politics, Vol 14, no. 2, (January 1969), p. 216. 
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democratic elections and governance, they may not always be intended to be the enduring form of 
government in a country. For instance, there,is little doubt that South African legislators will alter 
the system there to reflect less governing coalition consociationalism and more majoritarian model 
democracy: the Government of National Unity of the founding election was intended for the first 
parliament, not for all ensuing parliaments. 
OTHER INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Independent Radio and Other Non-Governmental Media 
A significant institutional change would be the abolition of a government newspaper, which tends to 
be heartily pro-SW APO, and the encouragement of a flourishing non-partisan print media. Namibia 
already boasts a highly free and lively press, but the resources available to New Era, given its pro-
government slant, are instrumental in setting SW APO at the head of the playing field. A national 
daily, in the vein of The Namibian, with the resources to publish in a number of Namibia's languages, 
would be helpful in presenting issues and party platforms on a daily basis, rather than merely at 
election time. Such a newspaper would also be important as a non-partisan means of criticizing the 
government to the electorate, on a daily basis. 
However, a consistently non-partisan country-wide, multi-language newspaper will not reach the 
large percentage of the population which is illiterate. Since most of the rural illiterate population 
is dependent on radio as a daily news source, a non-government run radio station, with the resources 
to broadcast to all of the country's language groups is necessary. The need and the desire already 
exist for these structures, but the resources continue to be lacking. A new, independent radio station 
was established last year, Radio 99, but at this point it broadcasts solely in English and Afrikaans, and 
only in the Windhoek, Skakopmund and Walvis Bay areas. International aid money should be · 
earmarked for development of these non-partisan media sources: the greater the access to 
information on the part of the voting population, the greater the chances that issue-voting will grow, 
that informed, non-symbolic electoral support will increase. These factors are vital to the growth 
and sustenance of a multi-party system. 
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Party Legislation 
Introduction of party legislation provides another means of levelling the playing field between the 
ruling party and the Opposition. This would not necessarily entail state-funding of political parties, 
which continues to be controversial in Namibia. Instead, party legislation would set limits for 
campaign spending, financial and other contributions, as well as determine parameters for government 
use of state resources and hopefully give access to free media during campaign periods. Opposition 
party leaders consistently observed that SW APO's unlimited access to state resources played a 
significant role in the continued electoral success of the ruling party. Use of planes, vehicles, state 
computers, faxes, telephones and other resources gave SW APO the advantage of easily reaching a 
wide audience frequently . 
. . . you can't oppose somebody who is flying by helicopter, who is flying by jet all over 
the country. He can address twenty meetings all over the country ... you are driving 
by road -- it's already unfair. He can appear on television even if you address a 
meeting on the same day, his meeting takes precedence. Yours comes as an 
afterthought. 2 
The goal of party legislation would be to give the opposition parties access to some of the state's 
resources or to limit SW APO's access to them during the campaign period, in an effort to level the 
playing field among the parties. 
State Information 
Another significant institutional change involves creating structures whereby the opposition parties 
can gain access to information. During the course of interviews, opposition leaders focused on 
their need for ready access to state information, though there is evidence that general information 
also needs to be made more available. Along these lines the government should create structures 
which guarantee opposition party access to state information; such guarantees could be outlined in 
the constitution or, more easily, in the standing rules and procedures of the National Assembly and 
the National Council. As previously discussed, the opposition parties can gain information through 
2Interview: Mishake Muyongo, Windhoek, 23 March 1995. 
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ministerial and official testimony in committee or through questions to ministers in the legislature; 
however, this is not always the most effective or timely means of obtaining vital information. 
Committee Participation 
Most policy-making actually occurs outside of the formal debating chambers of the legislative body 
in Namibia. Cabinet, dominated by SWAPO, introduces bills into the National Assembly; since there 
are few operational committees, the entire Assembly usually discusses amendments to a bill in a 
Committee of the Whole Assembly. The opposition parties have no means of guaranteeing their 
participation in cabinet, therefore, they need to become a more significant force within committees 
and sub-committees. As discussed in chapter three, there are no clearly defined rules or procedures 
for establishing or appointing members of committees of the National Assembly. Therefore, the 
challenge for the opposition members is to lobby the government to establish rules which guarantee 
Opposition participation on committees; this would most likely require an alteration in the standing 
rules and orders of the Assembly. In the interests of entrenching multi-partyism, the ruling party 
should be called upon to encourage such Opposition representation on committees. Little 
information is available regarding the committee system; even the minutes of the Standing Committee 
on Rules and Procedures, which might give insight into how committees are meant to be formed, 
are not available to the public. Without tangible proof it is difficult to argue that SW APO has 
purposefully virtually nullified the committee system in the interests of ruling party dominance, but 
this is a possibility to consider and to research further. The opposition parties also have a 
responsibility to be perceived as effective participants of the Assembly and thus useful members of 
parliamentary committees, especially among their peers. Moreover, the committee system needs to 
become more fully operational; the few committees which exist now will not give the opposition 
parties adequate scope for influence. 
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
Although certain institutional alterations within the Namibian political sphere may be instrumental 
in setting up additional structures whereby the opposition parties can participate more fully in policy-
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making and can increase their electoral support, greater emphasis must lie with the Opposition itself. 
The largest opposition party, the DT A, has the numbers and the funding, more so than any of the 
other parties, to have effective branches throughout the country. While an independent, non-
partisan, multi-language media will help the opposition parties to spread their message, the onus 
must be on them to reach the electorate. So, for instance, the organisational structure of the DTA 
should be evaluated to ascertain whether or not effective networking is being carried out -- getting 
the party's message out to the people as well as bringing in the opinions of the electorate to party 
headquarters, and more importantly, to the members of parliament. 
Alternative Policy Formulation 
Part of gaining greater support and becoming more effective participants in the legislative branch 
requires that the opposition parties run issue-based campaigns and that they oppose government 
policy with concrete alternatives. This would be one way in which to overcome the ethnic political 
divisions about which some of the opposition party leaders complain. Presenting concrete party 
manifestos over time will give the electorate specific policies with which to identify the various 
opposition parties -- giving them the chance to attract people based on specific needs and desires. 
Opposition Unity -- Coalition Building and Caucusing 
Perhaps the most significant organisational change that the opposition parties could affect within the 
Namibian political arena, in an effort to swell their ranks and increase their legislative influence, 
involves an exercise in caucusing, in unifying their voice at particular moments. Since their numbers 
have decreased substantially in the second parliament -- down to 19 from 3 1 -- the Opposition is even 
more dependent on some manner of unified strategy if its voice is to be heard over the ranks of the 
ruling party. There is probably little chance that all the opposition parties will unite into one 
coalition, forming a two-party system, at any time in the near future: ideological outlooks appear too 
divergent for that. Even coalition building among the smaller opposition parties has not ensured 
their electoral growth; the DCN gained only one parliamentary seat, though it represents the union 
of three parties with representatives in the first parliament. 
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The opposition parties, however, should be able to unify their voices during parliamentary sessions, 
caucusing effectively on legislation. The Opposition does not have the numbers to influence policy, 
which is necessary to be perceived as effective and policy-solid parties. One of the only available 
alternatives is for the opposition parties to band together, to make pre-session plans to vote similarly, 
to know and understand each others' positions on various policy: to caucus. None of the parties 
in the Second Parliament has the numbers to alter a SW APO vote or to crowd debate periods with 
their views. It is only by unifying their positions during the parliamentary sessions that the opposition 
parties will be able to make themselves heard and seen. The constitutional provision for a private 
member's bill provides a means by which minority members can introduce a bill on the floor of the 
Assembly given support of one-third of all members. Given the constitutionally mandated party 
discipline, which acts as a check on SW APO member support, a private members bill has no chance 
of being utilised by the Opposition in the Second Parliament; with just over 26% of the seats in the 
house, they do not meet the criteria for introduction of such a bill. Yet if their numbers rise even 
a small amount in the next parliament greater use of Article 60 could increase the level of Opposition 
influence. 
OTHER PROSPECTS FOR OPPOSITION GROWTH 
The nature of Namibian society and especially the fact that the country is extremely new to a 
democratic culture and democratic structures of governance contribute significantly to the failure 
of the opposition parties to grow in numbers and in influence. The antidotes for ethnically ordained 
voting patterns include a movement toward issue-based campaigning and polling, which is dependent 
on greater education; increased non-partisan media coverage and an augmented effort on the part of . 
all political parties to provide substantial alternatives and concrete policy platforms. All of the 
previously mentioned factors, in fact, directly or indirectly tie into the means of altering the ethnic 
basis of the society and of entrenching a culture of democratic values in Namibia. Political tolerance 
in all areas of the country and an issue-conscious electorate will benefit the opposition parties as long 
as they present policy platforms; these factors will, it is hoped, be advantageous for the growth of . 
the Opposition. 
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Ruling Party Split 
In the near future, given the relatively bleak performance of the opposition parties in the First 
Parliament and their subsequent numerically dictated inability to gain much influence in the Second 
Parliament, the most likely space for Opposition growth lies within the ruling party itself i.e. a split 
in the SW APO ranks. There has been increasing debate within Namibia about a possible future split 
in the ruling party. The numbers of SW APO supporters has grown over the past five years, as 
indicated in the party's improved electoral standing; if the rate of growth continues, SW APO will 
not be able to meet the contiguous needs and expectations of all the divergent support bases it now 
holds. In this instance, there is bound to be a split. This seems especially likely given the lack of 
young leaders in the party -- the split may be along these lines. Furthermore, unless SW APO alters 
the Namibian Constitution to make way for a third presidential term for Nujoma, the party will lose 
its vital figurehead in five years time. Much in the vein of South Africa's Nelson Mandela, Nujoma 
has an intense symbolic appeal which no other party presidential candidate could attempt to 
approximate at this time. Losing Nujoma could cut the electoral support currently afforded 
SW APO, though probably not significantly unless the opposition parties make effective concurrent 
overtures to the population. Nonetheless, the loss of Nujoma will be instrumental in affecting a 
schism within the party as factions form around proposed new presidential candidates. A split in 
SW APO would provide a needed boost to opposition politics in Namibia. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The prescriptions I have offered in this chapter could be instrumental in shaping the future of the 
Namibian opposition parties and, therefore, the entire political arena. All of the suggested changes 
will take time and effort to implement. Establishing party legislation, access to state information and 
an established committee system require lobbying of the ruling party by both the opposition parties, 
and civil society, including the NGO population. Independent radio and non-governmental media 
sources can be aided by NGO funding. Likewise, increasing the literacy and consolidating a 
democratic culture among the population are important goals of voter education projects such as the 




This paper indicates that the Opposition in Namibia has shown varying degrees of effectiveness in the 
First Parliament. The opposition parties have not been able to present themselves as a sincere 
"government in waiting," either in policy or in number. Nor have they managed to affect legislation 
to any large extent. However, as chapter five points out, they have used some of the space available 
to the Namibian Opposition to play a watchdog role on the ruling party. Criticising the Government 
will not alone gain the opposition parties greater actual legislative influence or electoral support; yet, 
it is an important aspect of opposition politics. 
I have noted a number of reasons for the overall poor showing of the opposition parties in the First 
Parliament and their subsequent inability to gain increased electoral support in the 1994 national 
elections. Institutional changes, such as guaranteed access to state information and a functioning 
committee system, would be important enabling structures for the opposition parties. However, as 
I have explained, alterations in the formal political arena will not alone engender greater influence on 
the part of the Opposition. Rather, much of the responsibility for gaining electoral support and 
increased legislative efficacy lies with the opposition parties themselves -- individually they need to 
present clear policy alternatives to attract votes and in the National Assembly they need to caucus 
effectively to increase the influence of their small numbers. The opposition parties are not victims 
within the system; rather, they should be active players, shaping their destinies with strong actions 
and effective platforms. The formal rules of the game can be adapted -- such as changing the nature 
of access to information or improving the committee system -- but by and large the structural political 
game board is permanent. Chapter five illustrates that the Namibian opposition parties still need to 
become good players of the opposition game. 
The socio-cultural context is another factor limiting the Opposition's growth, and, consequently, 
influence. The population in general does not cast votes based on specific issues. As Richard 
Moorsom indicates, "policy has virtually no effect on voting patterns in Namibia. "1 Rather, 
Namibians tend to vote according to a party's image or the broad ideological values which it 
1RichardMoorsom, Cape Town, 15 May 1995. 
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espouses. Development of civil society might be instrumental in politicizing the electorate, 
subsequently decreasing the occurrence of ethnic and symbolic-appeal voting patterns. At the same 
time, opposition parties must provide real policy alternatives to encourage the populace to cast issue-
based votes. 
Consensus was the mainstay for much of the First Parliament; all parties in the Constituent Assembly, 
and then the National Assembly, felt a certain pull toward national reconciliation and nation building. 
Though they tackled a number of controversial issues, the government and the opposition parties 
often emphasised compromise in policy legislation. Moorsom points out that the "sense of joint 
ownership of the legislative institutions [which marked the First Parliament] could become much more 
fractious with time."2 In the context of the First Parliament, then, there was limited scope for policy 
which differed significantly from that of the ruling party. With independence firmly behind, I 
anticipate increased policy division among political parties, marking a turn toward distinct policy 
platforms. 
A common theme throughout this final analysis is that time and experience will be important factors 
for increasing the electoral support and legislative influence of the Namibian Opposition, and, for 
the consolidation of multi-party democracy. Increasingly entrenched and understood government 
procedures will benefit all political parties, as will political experience. Opposition parties should 
become more adept at using the means available to them to influence policy. Time will also bring 
increased literacy and greater media sources to the population, encouraging voters to examine issues 
and candidates rather than just party image. 
Although the opposition parties bear substantial responsibility for increasing their influence and 
numbers, and for countering current socio-cultural factors which impede them, the ruling party 
likewise has a significant role to play in encouraging multi-partyism. As the government, SW APO 
can either make Opposition structures more assessable, or close them off more fully; the ruling party 
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can encourage transparency through the open dissemination of information to opposition parties, 
encourage alternate viewpoints through a functioning committee system which guarantees Opposition 
involvement, and promote political party legislation to level the campaign and inter-campaign playing 
field. In their analysis of the 1992 Local and Regional Elections Pendelton et. al. respond to the 
overwhelming win on the part of SW APO: "It is dangerous to lose sight of the fact, however, that 
this political outcome was the result of free and fair elections. "3 Yet, even a democratically-elected 
one-party state indicates the demise of a democratic culture and principles, both within the society 
and on the part of the ruling party. In a one-party system the ruling party can more easily become 
undemocratic, discouraging all forms of opposition. SW APO will be judged critically for indications 
that the ruling party is stifling or even merely not encouraging the survival and indeed the increased 
influence of the opposition parties. 
This paper has focused on the role of the Opposition within a majoritarian parliamentary system; it 
has offered an analysis of the effectiveness of the N arnibian opposition parties based primarily on the 
roles of watchdog and alternative policy formulation. Future studies might focus on other structures 
of opposition within Namibia, particularly the role of civil society in shaping policy decisions and in 
warding off one-party dominance. 
3Prof. Wade Pendelton et. al. A Study of Voting Behaviour in the 1992 Namibian Regional and Local 




Garoeb, Chief Justus, leader of the UDF. Windhoek, March 1995 
Johnson, Mary Elizabeth, NDI. Cape Town, April 1995. 
Katjioungua, Moses, leader of the DCN. Windhoek, March 1995. 
Martin, Erin, Director of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Namibia. Windhoek, 
March 1995. 
Moorsom, Richard, Research Fellow CHR Michelsen Institute. Cape Town, May 1995. 
Muyongo, Mishake, leader of the DTA. Windhoek, March 1995. 
Other Primary Sources 
The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. 
The National Assembly of the Republic of Namibia, Standing Rules and Orders. 
The Namibian, various articles 1989 - April 1995. 
Republic of Namibia, Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard), First Session - First Parliament 
through Ninth Session - First Parliament, Vol. 1 - 42. 
Troy, Carl F., Human Right/Democracy Project Officer, Embassy of the United States of America, 
Windhoek. Telefax communication, May 1995. 
Secondary Sources 
Africa South of the Sahara, 23rd Edition, London: Europa Publications Limited, 1994. 
Balch, Jeffrey and Jan Nico Scholten. 'Namibian Reconstruction and National Reconciliation: 
Putting the Horse before the Cart,' ROAPE, No. 49, Winter 1990, pp. 82-93. 
Budge, Ian and Hans Kernan. Parties and Democracy, Coalition Formation and Government 
Functioning in Twenty States, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Burger, Angela Sutherland. Opposition in a Dominant-Party System, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1969. 
Cliffe, Lionel. The Transition to Independence in Namibia, Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1994. 
Dahl, Robert, ed. Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1966. 
Dufresne, Corey. 'A Neo-Institutional Analysis of Opposition Structures in the South African 
Parliament,' unpublished paper, University of Cape Town, 1994. 
du Pisani, Andre. 'Parliamentary Democracy in Africa,' speech given on the occasion of briefing new 
members of Parliament, Windhoek, 13 March 199 5. 
Forrest, Joshua Bernard. "Namibia -- the first post-apartheid democracy?" Journal of Democracy. 
Vol. 5, July 1994, pp. 88-100. 
Gupta, Vijay, ed. Independent Namibia, Problems and Prospects, New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 
1990. 
Ionsecu, Ghita and Isabel Madariaga. Opposition: Past and Present of a Political Institution, 
London: C.A. Watts and Co. LTD, 1968. 
Kelly, Sean. The Namibian Voter Education Project, October 15 - December 15, 1992, Final 
Report. Washington D. C.: The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 
1993. 
LeBeau, Debie. 'Ethnic Stereotyping in a Post-Apartheid State,' NISER Research Report No. 5, 
Windhoek: Namibian Institute for Social and Economic Research, October 1991. 
Lewsen, Phyllis, ed. Helen Suzman's Solo Years, Johannesburg: Jonathan Bal and Ad. Donker 
Publishers, 1991. 
Leys, Colin and John S. Saul, Namibia's Liberation Struggle, The Two-Edged Sword, London: 
James Currey Ltd., 1995. 
Lindeke, William, Winnie Wanzala and Victor Tonchi. "Namibia's Election Revisited." Politikon. 
Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1992, pp. 121-138. 
Lijphart, Arend, and Bernard Grofman. Choosing an Electoral System, Issues and Alternatives, 
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. 
Lijphart, Arend. Democracies, Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984. 
Lijphart, Arend. 'Consociational Democracy.' World Politics, Vol. 14, no. 2, January 1969, pp. 
207-225. 
Martin, Carol Lynn. Namibia, the Parliament and Democracy, Symposium Report (18-20 
March 1991), the National Assembly ofNamibia and the National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs, Windhoek: New Namibia Books, 1991. 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). Information File for participants at 
NDI workshop on Building Political Parties at the Regional and Local Level, including, 
political party biographies, party manifestos for 1989 and 1992 elections, and 'Namibia 
Briefing Paper,' Washington D.C.: NDI, 1994. 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). Nation Building: The U.N and 
Namibia, Washington D.C.: NDI, 1990. 
Pendelton, Professor Wade, Toivo Shiimbi, Victor Tonchi, Winnie Wanzala .... A Study of Voting 
Behaviour in the 1992 Namibian Regional and Local Government Elections, Plus Election 
Statistics, Windhoek: University ofNamibia, October 1993. 
Potgieter, P.J.J.S. "The Resolution 435 Election in Namibia." Politikon. Vol. 18, No. 2, June 
1991, pp. 26-48. 
Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and party systems, a framework for analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976. 
Shapiro, Ian and Courtney Jung. South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy and 
Opposition in Comparative Perspective, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Working 
Paper No. 1052, Yale University, 1994. 
Totemeyer, Gerhard. The Prospects for Democracy and Development in an Independent 
Namibia, ID ASA Occasional Paper No. 28. 
Totemeyer, Gerhard. Reconstruction of the Namibian National, Regional and Local State, 
NISER Research Report No. 7, Windhoek: Namibian Institute for Social and Economic 
Research, March 1992. 
